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SUBCONSTITUTIONAL  CHECKS
Shima Baradaran Baughman*
ABSTRACT
Constitutional checks are an important part of the American justice system.  The Constitu-
tion demands structural checks where it provides commensurate power.  The Constitution
includes several explicit checks in criminal law.  Criminal defendants have rights to counsel,
indictment by grand jury, and trial by jury; the public or executive elects or appoints prosecutors;
legislatures limit actions of police and prosecutors; and courts enforce individual constitutional
rights and stop executive misconduct.  However, these checks have rarely functioned as intended
because the Constitution and criminal law have failed to create—what I call—“subconstitu-
tional checks” to adapt to the changes of the modern criminal state.  Subconstitutional checks are
stopgaps formed in the three branches of government to effectuate the rights in the Constitution
when the system is stalled in dysfunction, when one branch has subjugated the others, or when
two or more branches have colluded with one another.  The need for subconstitutional checks is
evident in the criminal arena.  In the modern criminal state, plea agreements have virtually
replaced jury trials, discipline and electoral competition between prosecutors is rare, separation of
powers does not serve its purpose because the interests of all branches are often aligned, and
individual constitutional rights have little real power to protect defendants from the state.  As a
result, the lack of structural constitutional checks in criminal law has led to constitutional dys-
function.  Though never recognized as such, constitutional dysfunction in criminal law is evi-
denced by mass incarceration, wrongful convictions, overly harsh legislation, and an inability to
stop prosecutor and police misconduct.  This Article sheds light on the lack of constitutional
checks by performing an external constitutional critique of the criminal justice system to explore
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this structural gap in the three branches and concludes that creating subconstitutional checks has
the potential of reducing criminal dysfunction and creating a more balanced criminal justice
system.
INTRODUCTION
Constitutional checks are integral to the American constitutional sys-
tem.1  State and federal constitutions explicitly protect criminal defendants
with individual rights that act as “checks” against government power.2  The
federal Constitution and most state constitutions provide individual constitu-
tional rights, including the right to counsel,3 the right to trial by jury,4 the
right to a grand jury,5 the right against self-incrimination,6 the right against
excess bail,7 the right against cruel and unusual punishment,8 and due pro-
cess protections.9  These constitutions also provide structural checks from
each branch.  From the executive branch, police and prosecutors enforce the
law with some autonomy but are subject to appointment, sometimes election
by the public, and to the limits and priorities of the chief enforcer, the presi-
dent or state governor.10  The legislature enacts criminal statutes that clearly
indicate when a person has broken the law, and is also subject to elections
and legislation priorities, partially based on an assessment of the laws it has
1 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2314, 2348–49 (2006) [hereinafter Katyal, Internal
Separation of Powers] (proposing “a set of mechanisms that can create checks and balances
within the executive branch in the foreign affairs area” because “[t]he pendulum today has
begun to swing so far toward executive branch vigor that one must fear that the principles
of divided government embraced by our Founders are no longer working”); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Stochastic Constraint, 126 HARV. L. REV. 990, 991 (2013) (reviewing JACK GOLDSMITH,
POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012)) (arguing that
“new” systems of checks and balances have “more costs . . . than the traditional, constitu-
tionally envisioned system”); see Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 517–19 (2015) (discussing the framers’ constitutional commit-
ment to checking state power, its evolution, and a need to reaffirm this commitment in our
generation and subsequent ones).
2 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 599
(2001) (arguing that the image of checks and balances created by legislatures, courts, con-
stitutions, and prosecutors is an “illusion” because power is concentrated in prosecutors).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4 Id.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6 Id.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
8 Id.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1.
10 Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 959, 961 (2009) (noting that “[w]hile in theory the separation of powers should
check prosecutors, in practice it does not. . . . Governors and Presidents exercise little or
no control over line prosecutors’ decisions” (footnote omitted)); Michael J. Ellis, The Ori-
gins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528, 1530 (2012) (“The United States is the only
country in the world where citizens elect prosecutors.”).
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passed.11  Finally, the judicial branch interprets the law fairly and ensures
that executive officers respect individual constitutional rights and that legisla-
tures enact clear statutes.12  All of these constitutional checks, if functioning
correctly, provide a structural balance in state and federal criminal justice.
Unfortunately, these constitutional checks are not functioning, most
markedly in the criminal justice system.  First, checks and balances are not
functioning in constitutional criminal procedure because often the
branches’ interests are aligned.13  For instance, legislatures especially in the
last fifty years have not acted as a check to executive power but instead have
colluded to enlarge the executive branch and pass harsher laws to punish
criminal defendants.14  In general, the branches work together exclusively to
protect against crime, as opposed to balancing community safety while
upholding the individual rights of the accused.  Second, most of the individ-
ual constitutional rights to be enforced by the courts are trial rights, and
trials have been replaced by a plea system that lacks a judicial enforcement
11 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (holding that vague
statutes should be stricken because they “fail[ ] to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute” and “encourage[ ]
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1953))); see also 17 OHIO
JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 501 (2015) (finding that “statutes which do not fairly inform a
person of what is prohibited will be found unconstitutional as violative of due process”).
12 Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 687
(1980) (“The historical genesis of article III confirms the Framers’ resolve to vest ‘the
judicial power of the United States’ in an independent department of government.  The
Framers conceived the grant of power to hear all cases ‘arising under the Constitution and
laws of the United States,’ as a mandate to the judiciary to check abuses of constitutional
limitations by the other two branches.  More than an affirmative grant of authority to the
judiciary, however, article III is a positive prohibition of interference with the exercise of
the judicial power by the legislative and executive branches.”).
13 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781,
782 (2006) (“Political incentives are the mechanism.  Constitutional law creates a series of
political taxes and subsidies, making some kinds of legislation and law enforcement more
expensive and others cheaper.  Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has regulated policing
and trial procedure aggressively, while leaving substantive criminal law and (until the past
few years) noncapital sentencing to the politicians.  Consequently, legislators find it easy to
expand criminal codes and raise sentences but harder to regulate policing and the trial
process.  These incentives apply to spending as well.  Prison budgets receive a constitu-
tional subsidy.  Budgets for criminal adjudication and (especially) local police are subject
to a constitutional tax.”  (footnote omitted)).
14 See Michael Buescher, Note, Rebuilding the Safety Mechanism: Does 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)
Violate the Separation of Powers?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1065, 1065 (2007) (arguing that “in
order to protect the perception of integrity in the criminal justice system, Congress should
revisit current sentencing policy and address perceived shortcomings in the allocation of
sentencing power between judges and prosecutors” (emphasis omitted)); see also United
States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125–26 (1979) (acknowledging, but not agreeing with,
the Seventh Circuit’s suggestion that dual provisions “might impermissibly delegate to the
Executive Branch the Legislature’s responsibility to fix criminal penalties”); Michael
Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 221, 233 (2003).
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valve for these rights.  Third, public elections of prosecutors are pro forma
and lack substantive checks on executive power, and legislative elections pro-
vide little accountability for criminal legislation passed.  And as a result, struc-
tural checks are lacking in criminal justice.
The lack of constitutional checks in criminal justice is considerable.
Without limits on the executive power to enforce the law and with an
increased efficiency in plea bargaining, arrest rates, conviction rates, and
detention rates (for both felonies and misdemeanors) have skyrocketed in
federal and state systems.15  This has been aided by the legislature’s increas-
ing the executive’s ability to punish with harsher laws and by the lack of pub-
lic knowledge about the effects of these laws on incarceration rates.  These
increases have led to mass incarceration, with the highest imprisonment rates
America has ever experienced, and an “epidemic” of prosecutorial miscon-
duct.16  Indeed, the result of a lack of structural constitutional checks has
been alarming.
In other areas, where constitutional checks are missing or failing, what I
call “subconstitutional” checks have been formed by the courts or legislature,
including 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as
two key examples.  Subconstitutional checks are stopgaps formed to effectu-
ate the rights in the Constitution when the system is stalled in dysfunction,
when one branch has subjugated the others, or when one branch has col-
luded with another. Subconstitutional checks are not derived explicitly from
15 See HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARREST IN THE UNITED STATES,
1990–2010, at 1 (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aus9010.pdf (noting that
the number of arrests for violent crimes, such as murder, rape, and aggravated assault, fell
significantly between 1990 and 2010, but “[t]here were 80% more arrests for drug posses-
sion or use in 2010 than in 1990”); John F. Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Admis-
sions and Populations 3 (July 12, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884674 (finding that felony filings rose thirty-five per-
cent from 1994 to 2008). See generally Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting
Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 497 (2012); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and
the Equitable Decision to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1698 n.195 (2010) (“The broken
windows theory, aggressive misdemeanor arrests, and intensive stop and frisks have
become not a substitute [for existing severe criminal penalties] but a supplement—a supple-
ment that . . . itself produces a dramatic increase in detentions, arrests, and criminal
records.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 6
(2001))); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320 (2012) (using
data to show that misdemeanors make up eighty to ninety percent of criminal cases and
arguing that the high number of misdemeanor arrests creates dysfunction in criminal
justice).
16 See William T. Pizzi, Understanding the United States’ Incarceration Rate, 95 JUDICATURE
207, 207–08 (2012) (discussing factors that have caused a rise in the incarceration rate in
the United States); Josh Keller, Why It Will Be Hard for Obama to Downsize Prisons, N.Y. TIMES
(July 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/21/us/politics/obama-
downsize-prisons-mass-incarceration.html (discussing why it will be difficult to downsize the
number of prisoners in the United States when our criminal justice system is primarily run
by state and local governments).
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constitutional language but from an interest in protecting explicit constitu-
tional structure and to give substance to specifically enumerated constitu-
tional rights.  For instance, in the civil arena, where the Constitution provides
that the executive branch may appoint inferior officers, the APA has come
into play to provide limits on the actions of these inferior officers and admin-
istrative bodies.17  Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment provides protection
against discrimination, and legislation under § 1983 provides an avenue for
these rights to be enforced.18  Basically, subconstitutional checks fill constitu-
tional gaps to actualize existing rights.  To be clear, subconstitutional checks
are not carte blanche criminal justice reform.  Subconstitutional checks are
not an effort simply to reign in prosecutorial power or reinvigorate judicial
enforcement of rights.  Subconstitutional checks are substitute checks to help
fill constitutional gaps in all three branches.
While many scholars have lamented the broken state of the criminal jus-
tice system19 and have prescribed single branch solutions to these
problems,20 scholarship to date has failed to appreciate the deep constitu-
tional roots of criminal justice dysfunction that involve all three branches.  It
has also failed to recognize that the Constitution protects individuals through
trial rights and we are operating in a system made up of pleas and imple-
menting these rights in today’s system requires constitutional adjustments.
While my aim is broader than simple acknowledgment of the root of criminal
justice dysfunction being a constitutional one, this alone is an important
recognition.
My goal in this project is to begin a study of how subconstitutional
checks can be created in criminal law.  It is a project that will extend past this
17 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West 2016) (governing federal administrative agencies and how
they may propose and create regulations under executive power).
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (allowing civil actions against state government officials for
violating rights in the Constitution).
19 See Doug Lieb, Note, Vindicating Vindictiveness: Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bar-
gaining, Past and Future, 123 YALE L.J. 1014, 1018–19 (2014) (pointing out that a flaw in the
criminal justice system comes from prosecutors having excessive discretion); see also WIL-
LIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2011); Gabriel J. Chin,
Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236, 2240 (2013) (recognizing
flaws in the criminal justice system and arguing the critical problem “is a lack of fairness in
deciding what to criminalize and how to enforce those prohibitions”); Nicola Lacey,
Humanizing the Criminal Justice Machine: Re-Animated Justice or Frankenstein’s Monster?, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (2013) (reviewing STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (2012)) (arguing the criminal justice system “is in urgent need of reform” because
“[t]he American criminal justice system is broken”).
20 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873 (2009) (describing how “federal prosecu-
tors’ offices could be designed to curb abuses of power through separation-of-functions
requirements and greater attention to supervision”); Lieb, supra note 19, at 1068 (“The
cleanest and most attractive solutions to the problem [of prosecutorial discretion] may also
be the most far-reaching: eliminating overlapping provisions of substantive criminal law,
reducing overall sentence lengths, promulgating stricter and more objective charging
guidelines within the executive.” (footnote omitted)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 6 21-MAR-17 11:42
1076 notre dame law review [vol. 92:3
initial Article, and that will hopefully invite future research.  Here, I start to
lay the foundation.  I endeavor to demonstrate that our criminal system is not
fulfilling the constitutional goals of the structure set out by the Founders.  I
describe in some detail the results of this lack of constitutional checks.  Then,
I begin to briefly explore some potential subconstitutional checks that could
provide more balance in the criminal justice system.  By no means does this
Article aim to provide a full framework that realizes all of the constitutional
protections—individual and structural—provided in the Constitution.
Instead, it aims to increase the promise of these rights by exploring how sub-
constitutional checks can be employed in criminal law as they have been in
other fields.
My discussion begins in Part I by laying a conceptual foundation.  I
describe the current constitutional checks provided by the three branches—
executive, legislative, and judicial.  After carefully enumerating the checks
provided, I begin to explain how they are not fulfilling the goals the Constitu-
tion set out.  Throughout Part I, I explore the notion of subconstitutional
checks and how they could fill the gaps left by a lack of structural checks in
criminal law.
Part II grounds the discussion in Part I by describing the effects of a lack
of structural checks and subconstitutional checks in criminal justice.  To
avoid abstraction, this Part describes one of the many constitutional dysfunc-
tions caused by a lack of subconstitutional checks—what I call the “Prosecu-
tor Problem.”21  In brief, the Prosecutor Problem is what modern scholars
claim is responsible for the astronomical increase in incarceration in
America in the last fifty years.22  While scholars have recognized the Prosecu-
tor Problem, none have satisfactorily explained why prosecutors have
increased charging and sentencing so dramatically.  The constitutional cri-
tique provided by this Article puts these charging decisions into perspective.
Without functioning checks, prosecutors have used harsh legislation without
accompanying limits to increase charging and individual sentences and have
retained immunity from accountability or, in large part, from the responsibil-
21 See infra Part II.
22 John F. Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story: Why the Conventional Wisdom on Prison
Growth Is Wrong, and Where We Can Go from Here, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 265, 269–70 (2014)
(suggesting that “it is clear that our attention should be on figuring out what is driving up
felony filings and thus admissions,” questioning whether it is “simply a change in
prosecutorial attitudes” or that “prosecutors use massively longer sentences as effective
hammers to bang out more pleas,” and continuing on to say that “[r]eforming penal prac-
tices in the United States is impossible without a solid, rigorous understanding of the key
forces at play”); John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1239, 1272–73 (2012) [hereinafter Pfaff, Micro and Macro Causes] (stating that prose-
cutors are responsible for prison growth in the United States because “at least since the
crime drop began in the early 1990s[,] [c]rime has been falling, arrests per crime have
been relatively flat (with a slight rise in the 2000s due to drug arrests), admissions per
felony filing have not budged, and time served has been relatively stable.  But felony filings
per arrest have soared during the 1990s and 2000s” but that the question of why prosecu-
tors are responsible “remains particularly unclear”).
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ity of fulfilling individual constitutional rights with a lack of judicial interven-
tion, all while contradicting the articulated executive agenda without any
recourse.  This Part uses the Prosecutor Problem as a case study, demon-
strates the results of a lack of constitutional checks or subconstitutional
checks, and demonstrates how dealing with the symptoms of the problem is
inadequate.
In Part III, I explore how subconstitutional checks can solve the constitu-
tional dysfunction caused by the inadequate existing constitutional checks in
the modern criminal justice system.  This Part envisions a potential for a fair
criminal justice system despite the prevalence of plea bargaining, the lack of
real executive elections, and the aligned interests between the branches.  I
provide here an initial blueprint that needs to be fully explored with future
work.
My claim here is certainly not that these changes alone would rehabili-
tate the criminal justice system of all dysfunction.  Nor is my claim that even
by addressing all of the existing constitutional gaps, each criminal defendant
in the system would experience a fair trial.  I certainly do not contend that
the subconstitutional checks provided here alone will rehabilitate the crimi-
nal justice system or provide for the lack of appreciation of individual consti-
tutional rights or structural protections provided in the Constitution.  I do,
however, believe—against the weight of modern criminal justice scholar-
ship—that a constitutional critique is necessary to provide a more complete
solution rather than a piecemeal solution to criminal justice problems.
Moreover, I contend that recognizing that there is a constitutional gap that
has led to many individual—and seemingly unconnected—problems helps
avoid the trap of blaming individual branches or looking for a simple reform
to resolve criminal justice dysfunction.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CHECKS IN CRIMINAL LAW
The U.S. Constitution was intended to be a slow-moving apparatus.  The
Montesquieuian structure of government divides power so that one branch
cannot control the other.23  The Constitution’s founding premise posits that
ambition should counteract ambition.  Constitutional checks and separation
23 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 216 (Thomas Nuggent trans.,
London, J. Nourse & P. Vaillant 1750) (“When the legislative and executive powers are
united in the same person, or in the same body of magistracy, there can be then no lib-
erty . . . . Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers.  Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul; for the judge would be then the legisla-
tor.  Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of
an oppressor.  Miserable indeed would be the case, were the same man, or the same body
whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting
laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or differences
of individuals.”).
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of powers—if working properly—require slow, deliberate change.24  Consti-
tutional checks prevent domination by one branch and provide internal
checks within each branch.  Separation of powers carefully divides power
between the three branches and allows the three branches to counterbalance
each other.25  The civil system, particularly the political process, largely func-
tions with the branches counterbalancing and often stalling the ability of the
government to act when their interests are not aligned.  However, the crimi-
nal justice system has changed from what was envisioned as a slow-moving
apparatus—where divergent interests balanced each other—to a machine
that processes many individuals extremely quickly.26  This Part discusses the
historical and existing individual and structural constitutional rights in crimi-
nal justice in order to understand the constitutional problem in criminal law.
The Federal Constitution provides several individual constitutional
rights, including the right to counsel, the right to trial by jury, the right to a
grand jury, the right against self-incrimination, the right against excessive
bail, the right against cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to due
process.27  Historically, the Constitution has never functioned perfectly.  The
public acted as a democratic check on criminal charging; it was important
that charges were public and that a defendant received notice to protect due
24 It is important to note here that the discussion of separation of powers throughout
this Article is relevant to the federal government and the forty out of fifty state govern-
ments that require three separate branches. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83–84
(1902).
25 See Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 2318 (pointing out that “[i]n
many ways, the status quo is the worst of all worlds because it creates the fac¸ade of external
and internal checks when both have withered”).
26 This is not to say that the early criminal justice system functioned in accord with
constitutional principles.  There is an argument to be made that the early criminal justice
system in America conducted many trials a day and processed individuals quickly.  How-
ever, these individuals were subject to a jury trial. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 112-9,
at 1400–01 (2013) (“The right to a speedy trial may be derived from a provision of Magna
Carta and it was a right so interpreted by Coke.  Much the same language was incorporated
into the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 and from there into the Sixth Amendment.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 436 (3d ed. 2005) (“[T]he real criminal justice system was made up of
many overlapping layers, none of which resembled very closely the ideal picture of crimi-
nal justice.  There were at least three of these layers: the bottom layer, where courts han-
dled tens of thousands of petty cases rather roughly and informally; a middle layer, for
serious but ordinary cases . . . and a top layer, made up of a few dramatic cases—cases
where the crime was especially lurid or the defendant a prominent or unusual person, or
both of these.”); Natalia Nicolaidis, The Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy and Public Trial, 26
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1489, 1489–98 (1989).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. V (right to counsel, right to a grand jury, right against self-
incrimination, and right to due process, applied to the federal government); id. amend. VI
(right to trial by jury and right to counsel); id. amend. VIII (excessive bail); id. amend.
XIV, § 1 (right to due process, applied to states).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 9 21-MAR-17 11:42
2017] subconstitutional  checks 1079
process rights.28  In addition, grand juries were used regularly as a barrier to
charging innocent members of the public and as a check against a powerful
government.29  Juries—the conscience of the community—were also impor-
tant historically to prevent injustice in criminal charging or prosecution.30
Certainly, historically the criminal system processed much fewer people in a
much less complicated statutory scheme.  And while undoubtedly the early
criminal justice system processed much fewer people for only a handful of
crimes, these trials were often done very quickly and without all of the
intended constitutional rights.31  At the time of the Founding, there was a
simple criminal justice system, and so simple structural protections func-
tioned, including a robust grand jury and a jury trial.  However, right to
counsel applied only if an individual could afford an attorney.32  The right
against self-incrimination allowed brutality in interrogations.33  Punishment
was cruel by today’s standards of due process.34  So, while constitutional pro-
tections existed, they were not robust or inclusive in practice.35  In other
words, imperfections have always existed in effectuating criminal rights.
28 Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 768–69
(2011).
29 Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 918–20 (2006) (“Lay magistrates, lay constables, and lay juries ran criminal jus-
tice.  Jurors were prized as popular local voices who could represent and express the com-
munity’s sense of justice.” (footnote omitted)); see also Niki Kuckes, The Democratic
Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265,
1299–1306 (2006).
30 LAURA I. APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 1–5 (2015); see also GEORGE JOHN EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 16 (1906).
31 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 437 (“Here, ordinary cases of assault, theft, burglary,
and similar crimes were prosecuted.  The trial courts, as far as we can tell, were by no
means kangaroo courts; but there were no long, drawn-out trials.  The ‘hypertrophy’ of
due process had no role in these courts.  For many defendants, there was no trial at all.”).
32 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
33 Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory
Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part II), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 546–47
(1992) (“Indeed, the remnants of physical brutality in modem interrogation practice are
more likely to occur in police interrogation than in any other governmental setting.”); see
also Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused—A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30
MICH. L. REV. 1224, 1255 (1932).
34 Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Due Process and Cruel Punishment, 64 HARV. L. REV. 271, 271
(1950) (“A search through the rather extensive judicial literature devoted to cruel and
unusual punishment turns up few cases where men have been set at liberty by the Eighth
Amendment or by the Fourteenth incorporating the prohibition of the Eighth.” (footnote
omitted)); Robert J. McWhirter, Baby, Don’t Be Cruel: What’s So “Cruel & Unusual” About the
Eighth Amendment? Part 1, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Dec. 2009, at 13, 14 (noting that “the Eighth Amend-
ment was part of a movement of punishment reform” and that “[m]ore pertinent to consti-
tutional interpretation is that the words are also relative to the age.  What is cruel at one
point in history is not so in another”).
35 Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1279
(2000) (“The significance of the battle over the presence of people of color on juries
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Though individual constitutional rights for criminal defendants are
explicit in the Constitution, and provide more expansive criminal rights than
civil rights, these constitutional rights provided little protection for defend-
ants until the 1960s.  The constitutional criminal justice system was examined
closely by the Supreme Court in the 1960s rights revolution.36  During that
time, new constitutional protections—or what can be identified as the first
subconstitutional checks—gave life to constitutional structure by adding judi-
cial checks to protect constitutional rights.  The 1960s Warren Court insisted
that the judiciary needed to take a more active role in enforcing existing
constitutional protections.37
Some of these subconstitutional checks were referred to as prophylactic
checks to protect explicit constitutional rights during trial.38  For instance,
Miranda v. Arizona39 protected the explicit rights in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments during a time when the Court believed these individual rights
were not being honored.40 Gideon v. Wainwright41 enlarged the constitu-
tional right to counsel by requiring states to provide counsel to those who
could not afford their own attorneys.42 Brady v. Maryland43 added a subcon-
stitutional check on executive power by requiring that prosecutors turn over
exculpatory information to defendants.44  These rights have enforced a
belief that the modern constitutional criminal justice system provides defend-
ants with a fair trial.
Unfortunately, though, the modern Supreme Court has since eroded
these new constitutional protections.45  And these protections largely func-
should not be underestimated.  Throughout most of this country’s history, courts excluded
people of color from jury service.”).
36 William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2003 (2008) (noting that
“criminal liability grew both broader and more rule-like after the Warren Court decisions
of the 1960s, and severe sentencing rules multiplied”).
37 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966) (“The cases before us raise
questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the
restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting indi-
viduals for crime.”).
38 Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophy-
lactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 940 (1999) (noting that Miranda rights have been called
prophylactic).
39 384 U.S. 436.
40 Id. at 442 (stating that the Court’s holding “is an application of principles long
recognized” and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are “precious rights [that] were fixed in
our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle”).
41 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
42 Id. at 344 (finding that “any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him”).
43 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
44 Id. at 87 (holding that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”).
45 Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015) (stating that “[t]here
is . . . little doubt that Brady transgressions have become salient” in both state and federal
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tion only if there is a trial, which is how most cases were handled in the
1960s. Miranda is a right that protects a defendant against evidence intro-
duced at trial.46 Brady is a post-plea issue.47  And even Gideon does not guar-
antee an attorney in key pretrial stages.48  Indeed, the subconstitutional
checks of the 1960s gave life to the constitutional structure by adding checks
to the process.  However, these checks have since been eroded, and many do
not apply to the modern plea system—plea negotiations were first approved
broadly in 1967 and began to dominate the system in the 1980s and 1990s.49
prosecutions); Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing
Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 670 (1992) (“As courts have begun to
face large numbers of drug and organized crime cases, they have increasingly encountered
a new form of attorney-client relationship that has prompted the judiciary to curtail the
reach of right-to-counsel protections.” (emphasis omitted)); William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s
Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 978 (2001) (discussing the Miranda doctrine and why this
solution to regulatory problems has “unraveled,” as well as “the distributive consequences
of the unraveling”).
46 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (“[O]ur accusatory system of criminal
justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evi-
dence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedi-
ent of compelling it from his own mouth.” (citation omitted)).
47 Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (“It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by
mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a
trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a
deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be per-
jured.  Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a
defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of
a like result by intimidation.” (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
48 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (discussing that in our country
“[t]he right of one charged with crime to counsel [is] deemed fundamental and essential
to fair trials”).
49 Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6, 38, 40
(1979) (“In the decades following the 1920’s, American criminal courts became even more
dependent on the guilty plea. . . . The ‘due process revolution’ also led directly to more
intense plea negotiation. . . . By 1970, the due process revolution had run its course, and
the Supreme Court, which bore a share of responsibility for the dominance of the guilty
plea, was ready at last to confront this central feature of American criminal justice.  In a
series of decisions which implied that any other course would be unthinkable, the Court
upheld the propriety of plea bargaining.  It insisted that plea bargaining was ‘inherent in
the criminal law and its administration . . . .’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970))); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109
YALE L.J. 857, 864 (2000) (“In the last quarter of the century, as judges converted to the
cause, plea bargaining most often took the form of sentence bargaining, in which the defen-
dant’s plea won a reduced sentence.  Backed by judges as well as prosecutors, plea bargain-
ing now broke the narrow hold of liquor and murder prosecutions and conquered the
whole penal territory—so that by century’s close, guilty pleas accounted for some eighty-
seven percent of criminal adjudications in Middlesex County.”); Note, Plea Bargaining and
the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564, 564 (1977) (“[T]he locus of
the criminal process has shifted largely from trial to plea bargaining.  In the vast majority
of cases, guilt and the applicable range of sentences are determined through informal
negotiations between the prosecutor and the defense attorney.”).
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In addition, since the 1960s, increased criminal legislation,50 increased
charging and sentencing,51 and increased efficiency call for a reevaluation of
the constitutional rights with the modern system.  And indeed many scholars
would agree that the individual constitutional protections, including the
right to counsel,52 the grand jury right, the excessive bail clause, the jury trial
right, and the due process rights of defendants, are regularly violated in our
current criminal justice system.53
50 Stuntz, supra note 13, at 800–01 (discussing “the mountain of state and federal legis-
lation dealing with sentencing procedure, nearly all passed since the mid-1970s.  Of all
aspects of the criminal process, sentencing has seen the most legal innovation over the past
three decades,” and noting that the examples referred to in the article “are recent; the
legislation in question has been enacted since the late 1960s, much of it in the past dec-
ade” (footnote omitted)); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Proce-
dure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (1987) (noting that “[t]he last three decades’
expansion of the law of criminal procedure has taken place against the backdrop of [the]
rise in prosecutorial budget constraint”).
51 In 1967, the American Bar Association and the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice approved the concept of plea bargaining,
though before this time it was viewed as a disfavored and lazy prosecution practice that was
ignored by the courts.  Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in the Plea Bargaining, 36 U.
CHI. L. REV. 50, 50–52 (1968).
52 Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon
v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152–53 (2013) (describing the failure of the modern
right to counsel, with many defendants not receiving adequate or timely representation
and pleading guilty before even consulting with a lawyer); Lincoln Caplan, The Right to
Counsel: Badly Battered at 50, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/
10/opinion/sunday/the-right-to-counsel-badly-battered-at-50.html (describing that, in
ninety-five percent of criminal cases, and with eighty percent of criminal defendants who
cannot afford to pay for lawyers, the promise of the right to counsel is largely unmet).
53 The jury right is weak today; in state and federal court only five percent of cases or
fewer go to a jury. See Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND.
L.J. 397, 398, 399 (2009) (arguing the right to jury trials “has been lost” and that today’s
“interpretations have shifted the meaning of the jury trial right well away from its original
meaning”); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459–60 (2004) (tracing the
decline in cases going to jury trials in federal and state courts).  The grand jury right is not
more than a rubber stamp today, and does not protect defendants as it historically did.
George H. Dession, From Indictment to Information—Implications of the Shift, 42 YALE L.J. 163,
163 (1932) (stating that “the grand jury is seldom better than a rubber stamp of the prose-
cuting attorney and has ceased to perform or be needed for the function for which it was
established”).  Also, the Excessive Bail Clause has no real meaning in the modern day crim-
inal justice system.  Scott W. Howe, The Implications of Incorporating the Eight Amendment Pro-
hibition on Excessive Bail, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1039, 1039–40 (2015) (finding the Excessive
Bail Clause means nothing in modern criminal law as the Supreme Court “has not issued
an opinion applying the Excessive Bail Clause in more than 25 years and has rendered only
two others in its history” (footnotes omitted)).  And the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause also provides no substantive rights in modern criminal law.  Comment, Rummel v.
Estelle: Leaving the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in Constitutional Limbo, 15 VAL. U.
L. REV. 201, 209 (1980) (finding that although the Supreme Court acknowledges the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, “[it] has rarely invoked the [Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments] clause to invalidate harsh sentences”).
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The Constitution also provides structural constitutional rights in crimi-
nal law.  However, many of these checks are not functioning—and arguably
have never functioned—as actual checks on executive power.  The Constitu-
tion provides that the legislature is to enact criminal statutes that clearly indi-
cate when a person has broken the law in order for a person to be
punished.54  The legislature must also provide a check on the executive by
giving the power to punish individuals only for crimes that the public believes
violate the conscience of the community.  Another legislative check is confir-
mation of the head federal executive officer, like a U.S. Attorney General by
the Senate, and that the Attorney General must answer to hearings in Con-
gress.55  The Constitution provides that if there are abuses in the executive
branch, inferior officers (such as prosecutors) may be impeached.56  As
agents of the executive, prosecutors have autonomy to enforce the law, with
guidance from the chief enforcer, the president.57  Often the president and
the executive branch do not have to give information to the other branches
about how they enforce the law in the criminal realm like they do in the civil
realm.58  Finally, the judicial branch should provide a serious constitutional
check on prosecutorial discretion by stopping the law from applying in an
unjust or unconstitutional manner.59  However, in a system dominated by
pleas, judges do not enter the rooms where criminal justice decisions are
54 See supra note 11.
55 153 CONG. REC. 7651 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2007).
56 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
57 Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 521 (2005).
58 The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) governs the creation and operation of
advisory committees in the executive branch of the government.  See 37A AM. JUR. 2D Free-
dom of Information Acts § 35 (2016).  Congress enacted the FACA as a means to control the
establishment of advisory committees to the executive branch and to allow the public to
monitor their creation, activities, and cost, thus enhancing their public accountability. Id.
Under the FACA, for example, advisory committees “must . . . open their meetings to the
public and make their minutes, records and reports publicly available.”  Judicial Watch,
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 736 F. Supp. 2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 2010).  Advisory commit-
tees subject to the Act, however, are closed to the public when their meetings involve mat-
ters qualifying under an exemption listed within the Freedom of Information Act. See 5
U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012); see also, e.g., Aftergood v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 355 F. Supp.
2d 557, 562 (D.D.C. 2005) (stating that the Central Intelligence Agency’s budget informa-
tion is protected from disclosure because it “relates to intelligence methods, namely the
allocation, transfer and funding of intelligence programs” (quoting Aftergood v. Cent.
Intelligence Agency, No. 02-1146, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2004))). But see Gates v.
Schlesinger, 366 F. Supp. 797, 801 (D.D.C. 1973) (requiring officials from the Department
of Defense to open to the public a meeting of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women
in the Services).
59 Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 801 (2003) (arguing that
the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently rejected government attempts to condition the
receiving of benefits on waiver of constitutional protections, but suggesting the Court has
ignored this approach within the criminal law context by allowing waiver of “the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial, to
confrontation of witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel. . . in exchange for reduced
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made, and the constitutional protections for criminal defendants are of little
worth.  State separation of powers works differently and depends on whether
prosecutors are elected at a state level, elected at a county level, or
appointed.60  While the principles from the federal system do not directly
apply, the principles are the same and many states struggle with the lack of
structural checks.  This is particularly a problem where there are no elected
prosecutors or even where counties elect prosecutors; often those prosecu-
tors have no accountability to the state executive branch.  County and city
prosecutors also have near unlimited discretion; they take little direction and
often lack accountability to higher executive leaders.61
The next three Sections discuss how the three government branches
have carried out their mission of providing checks in criminal law.  They
explain the weaknesses of the existing explicit constitutional checks: elec-
tions and confirmations, judicial review of constitutional rights, and limiting
legislation.  They also explore subconstitutional checks in the civil arena: the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),62 § 1983 actions,63 and the APA,64
which were created to add checks where they do not exist in the Constitution
and where the ordinary checks were inadequate or outmoded.  These sub-
constitutional checks provide balance in other areas but are either absent or
anemic in criminal justice.
A. Executive Checks
The Constitution provides for several explicit checks on the executive
branch.65  These include the power of the executive branch to appoint infer-
ior officers, including prosecutors.66  The executive branch also enjoys the
power to provide clemency to those who are prosecuted.67  While the execu-
tive branch does provide some checks to its inferior officers—particularly
prosecutors—these checks are anemic or nonfunctional.  Rachel Barkow has
carefully articulated some of these key arguments.68  A key element to a lack
sentences, dismissal of additional charges, or other benefits, when defendants plead guilty
pursuant to plea agreements” (footnote omitted)).
60 The three branches of government exist in the federal system and in most states,
though ten states do not require separation of powers in their constitutions. See supra note
24.
61 See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
717, 773 (1996) (“In fact, current prosecutorial discretion is virtually unlimited . . . .”).
62 5 U.S.C. § 552 (allowing for the disclosure of previously unreleased information
controlled by the federal government).
63 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
64 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559.
65 U.S. CONST. art. II.
66 Id. art. II, § 2.
67 Id. (stating that the president “shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offenses against the United States”).
68 See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of
Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 342 (2013) (arguing the need for a “sound criminal justice
administration . . . from many sources, not just those charged with prosecuting cases”); see
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of executive checks is that the courts have worked hand-in-hand with prose-
cutors to make prosecutors more efficient and have helped them achieve
easier criminal convictions in several areas,69 including the Fourth Amend-
ment70 and the Confrontation Clause.71
Prosecutors are the executive’s agents, charged with enforcing the law
under the direction of the executive branch’s prerogative.72  The Constitu-
tion protects executive privilege73 and explicitly requires the executive to dis-
close little to the other branches, except for the state of the union.74
Executive privilege may be claimed where secrecy avoids a greater harm.75
And in the criminal arena, the executive branch provides the least gui-
dance and most discretion to prosecutors compared to other inferior
officers.76  First, the criminal justice system does not have the typical subcon-
stitutional checks that other agencies must comply with, including providing
information about their enforcement priorities, FOIA requests, or other APA
obligations.  Second, the criminal justice system lacks formal guidance or
goals that are dictated from the executive to guide decisionmaking more
broadly, which provides them more discretion than other executive actors.
also Barkow, supra note 20, at 885 (analyzing the lack of administrative checks on prosecu-
tors and their decisionmaking); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law,
58 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow, Separation of Powers] (arguing that
“unlike the administrative law context,” where agencies’ decisions are subject to judicial
review and political oversight, there are no institutional checks when it comes to matters in
criminal law).
69 Pamela R. Metzger, Confrontation as a Rule of Production, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
995, 1009 (2016) (explaining that the Supreme Court, with its Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence, openly attempted to balance the interests of the accused with the interest in
effective law enforcement and that as “prosecutors and their allies grew bolder, [they]
urg[ed] the Court to limit [the Confrontation Clause’s] production mandate in order to
facilitate faster, cheaper, and easier criminal convictions”).
70 Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (2013) (dem-
onstrating that the Supreme Court sides with prosecutors eighty percent of the time when
it is “balancing,” and focuses largely on effective law enforcement over citizen privacy when
it comes to the Fourth Amendment).
71 Metzger, supra note 69, at 1009 (“Eventually, confrontation’s effects on case out-
comes, prosecutorial resources, and larger societal interests came to dominate the Court’s
confrontation jurisprudence.”).
72 See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F. 2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965); Frenzel v. State,
963 S.W. 2d 911, 916 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
73 Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 371 F. Supp. 97, 100 (D.D.C. 1974) (stating that
recognition of executive privilege requires “a delicate balancing of competing interests:
the public’s interest in preserving confidentiality to promote open communication neces-
sary for an orderly functioning of the government, and the individual’s [or government’s]
need for disclosure of particular information”).
74 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1 (requiring that the president “from time to time give to
the Congress Information of the State of the Union”).
75 See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Executive Privilege § 487 (2016).
76 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed”).
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The criminal justice system is not subject to normal executive constraints
like FOIA, the APA, or other reviews to which executive agencies usually have
to answer.77  FOIA is founded in First Amendment principles that encourage
transparency.78  FOIA enables the public to request documents and policy
procedures.79  But some executive officers in the criminal arena are exempt
from FOIA requirements.80  For instance, federal prosecutors do not have to
answer FOIA requests and are not required to provide information that other
agencies have to provide that explain their decisionmaking.81  And in state
prosecutor offices, there is even less control or oversight, as there are differ-
ent elected officers who have no accountability to higher officials, and the
system is much less centralized.  As just one example of this issue, the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers sued to obtain a copy of
the “Blue Book,” an internal document that instructs federal prosecutors on
discovery matters,82 and was denied this internal guide.83  The U.S. Attorney
refused to release this manual, claiming that it violated separation of powers.
77 Although the Freedom of Information Act and the Administrative Procedure Act
technically apply to all executive administrations and departments, they contain exemp-
tions that largely protect all federal criminal justice agencies from disclosure. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7) (2012); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Frequently Asked Questions, FOIA.GOV,
https://foia.gov/faq.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (Congress has created an exclusion for
“criminal law enforcement agencies” and thus, relevant records “are not subject to the
requirements of the FOIA”).  In discussing this exemption, the D.C. Circuit has held that
there is “a relatively low bar for [an] agency to justify withholding [information under
FOIA] exemption 7(E).”  Blackwell v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 646 F.3d 37, 42 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (quoting Mayer Brown LLP v. Internal Revenue Serv., 562 F.3d 1193, 1194 (D.C.
Cir. 2009)).
78 See David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 295 (2010).  The negative
rights in the First Amendment permit “Americans to be free from certain forms of govern-
ment intervention” and “to obtain information.” Id.
79 See Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617,
639, 646–47 (2010) (noting that the Freedom of Information Act, Sunshine Act, Federal
Advisory Committee Act, and Presidential Records Act allow citizens and interest groups to
access information previously kept secret).
80 Id. at 644–45 (listing the different executive offices and officers that are exempt
from FOIA).
81 FOIA requests made to U.S. Attorneys’ offices must be answered; even if the answer
is only to invoke an exemption.  However, the federal prosecutors never personally
respond.  Federal prosecutors do not personally handle FOIA requests; they are instructed
in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual that upon receipt of a FOIA request, it should be “forwarded
to the FOIA/PA Unit of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys.” OFFICE OF THE
U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 3-17.130
(1997) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL].
82 Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers v. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 75 F. Supp.
3d 552, 561 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that the FOIA request for the Federal Criminal Discov-
ery Blue Book should be denied as the book is attorney work-product), aff’d, 829 F.3d 741
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
83 In response to a controversy that led many federal prosecutors’ offices to release
copies of their offices’ policies on discovery in criminal cases, the Justice Department pre-
pared a detailed guide for prosecutors known as the Blue Book.  It has refused to make this
handbook public.  Brad Heath, Rules to Keep Federal Prosecutors in Line Revealed, USA TODAY
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I do not argue here that the Blue Book should be distributed by the execu-
tive to the public, but it should be shared with members of the legislative
branch.  This example is simply to illustrate the difference in treatment
between prosecutors and other executive branch officers, who are routinely
required to provide specific information on their internal decisionmaking,
for instance, under the APA.  Indeed, other executive agencies routinely
report to the executive and other branches on their internal discovery proto-
cols, without violating separation of powers.84  Needless to say, no other
administrative agency would be permitted to write an agency handbook
about how it enforces the laws but refuse to share it with the other branches
or the public.  These would certainly have to be released to the public due to
the APA,85 though because of the Armstrong doctrine, prosecutors are
exempt from these requirements in criminal cases.86
Some scholars have argued that prosecutors are special executive actors
who should be treated differently, and that prosecutorial discretion is neces-
sary and efficient.87  The argument goes: prosecutors have in-depth institu-
tional knowledge of the criminal justice system, which often puts them in the
best position to make decisions.88  Prosecutors speak legalese.  They are
familiar with criminal procedure and the different circumstances that arise
during litigation.89  Given prosecutors’ “distinct perspective” on how the
criminal justice system works, it is often practical to defer to them.  However,
this argument does not set prosecutors apart from any other agency.  All
agency actors have special knowledge of their field.  For instance, EPA
officers have a distinct perspective on environmental regulation and the laws
that dictate air quality protection.  This does not shield them from providing
the handbooks they use to guide their decisionmaking in enforcing statutes
(Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/03/03/justice-department-
discovery-policies-released/24239225/.
84 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 4, 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-4, 129 Stat. 39 (containing a compre-
hensive list of required reports to Congress from, among other departments, the judicial
branch, the President of the United States, and cabinet-level departments within the exec-
utive branch and the corresponding authority and nature of such reports).
85 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012).
86 Id. § 552(b)(7). See generally United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, (1996)
(holding that for a defendant to establish entitlement to discovery on a claim of selective
prosecution based on race in a criminal case, the defendant must produce credible evi-
dence that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted but
were not).
87 Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial Charging Deci-
sions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion—Knowing There Will Be Consequences for Crossing
the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371, 376 (2000) (“[S]ome prosecutorial discretion is necessary for
an efficient and effective criminal justice system.”); see Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Pro-
cedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 289 (1983) (arguing that prosecutorial
discretion is a necessary element of a “well-functioning market system”).
88 Moore, supra note 87, at 379 (“The prosecutor is in the best position and has the
expertise to make the complex charging decisions that are necessary in an individualized
criminal justice system.”).
89 Id.
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Congress has passed with regard to air quality.90  Indeed, prosecutors have
special privileges even among other executive branch officers that allow them
to provide less information and obtain little review.
Second, prosecutors do not receive guidance in the same way from the
executive on enforcement priorities and expectations like other branches or,
more importantly, periodic review of the charging and prosecution decisions
they make.  Many branches of the executive receive directives from the exec-
utive to follow central enforcement objectives in their particular area.  For
instance, if a particular president wants to heavily enforce a prohibition of
animal grazing on federal lands, or designate an area of land as a wilderness
study area, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) would be instructed of
that and would enforce it strictly throughout the area.91  If, rather, the presi-
dent prefers to encourage economic development on public lands, he or she
will encourage the agency to issue more mining permits on federal land.92
These objectives are all within statutory rights of the agency, but depending
on who the president is, the enforcement priorities will change and the
agency will make different decisions throughout the country.  These deci-
sions are tracked and the agency head is accountable for following the gui-
dance of the executive and achieving his or her goals.  This kind of
coordinated guidance from the executive is largely missing in criminal law.
Criminal justice enforcement priorities and outcomes are often indi-
rectly affected at the federal and state levels through budget allocations and
staffing.  For instance, if drug prosecutions are a focus of the executive, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) provides a larger budget and more staff attor-
neys in that section.93  Similarly, if the county sexual-assault crimes division
has five attorneys and the white-collar crime division has ten, this may
represent the relative number of cases brought by the respective divisions.
Overall, the growth in numbers of prosecutors can be one contributing fac-
tor to an overall increase in felonies and misdemeanors charged.94  However,
90 See, e.g., MONICA NEES, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/R-94/038a, QUALITY
ASSURANCE HANDBOOK FOR AIR POLLUTION MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS: VOLUME 1—A FIELD
GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ASSURANCE (1993).
91 See, e.g., California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat.
4471; Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-77, 107 Stat. 756; San Rafael Swell
National Heritage and Conservation Act, H.R. 3625, 105th Cong. (1998).
92 James William Gibson, Cleaning Up Bush’s Mess on Public Land, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2,
2009), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-oe-gibson2-2009apr02-story.html (“During the
Bush era, millions of acres of public land were leased for oil and gas drilling and log-
ging.”); see, e.g., The Bush Record, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.laondaverde.org/
bushrecord/wildlife.asp (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (follow Wildlands & Wildlife hyperlink,
then see the Energy and Public Lands heading) (giving examples of where President Bush
issued permits to drill and mine on public land).
93 Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 231 n.11 (2015) (noting
that during President Ronald Reagan’s first term in office, the Drug Enforcement Agency’s
spending drastically increased from $86 million to over $1 billion).
94 The latest data for prosecutors in state courts is from 2007 and is limited to prosecu-
tors’ offices with general felony responsibility—excluding both municipal and county
offices prosecuting misdemeanors and attorneys assigned to criminal matters within their
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often these decisions to charge a certain number of crimes or certain crimes
over others are not coordinated or reviewed by the executive.  And in state
surveys, prosecutors reported submitting reports to federal, state, or local
bodies on their case dispositions (including felony convictions, guilty pleas,
and declinations) about forty-seven percent of the time.95  Thus, reporting of
declinations and convictions is not happening with the frequency that is ideal
for the executive to appropriately review the decisions of its inferior officers.
And to the extent these decisions are reviewed, there is no widespread or
consistent feedback provided from higher executive officers (president or
state governor) to inferior officers (like prosecutors).
For instance, the goal of decreasing incarceration rates was a stated goal
of President Obama.96  He has remarked quite famously about the injustice
reflected in the number of Americans who are incarcerated and particularly
the disproportionate number of black Americans who are incarcerated in the
United States.97  Based on this, it would seem that decreasing incarceration
rates would have been a priority for President Obama.  However, U.S. prose-
cutors do not have a coordinated policy of considering high incarceration
rates when making decisions.  In fact, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual contains no
respective state attorney general’s office.  The 2330 prosecutors’ offices reported employ-
ment of 32,622 attorneys bearing some responsibility for criminal cases. See STEVEN W.
PERRY & DUREN BANKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS
IN STATE COURTS, 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/psc07st.pdf.  This is an increase of approximately nine to eleven state felony prosecu-
tors per 100,000 U.S. residents from the 22,234 prosecutors employed in 1990. See JOHN
M. DAWSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE
COURTS, 1990, at 9 (1992), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc90.pdf.  For U.S.
population growth data between 1990 and 2007, see 1990 Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(1990), http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen1990.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2017), and
Vintage 2007: National Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2007), http://www.census.gov/popest/
data/historical/2000s/vintage_2007/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
95 PETER BRIEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORTING BY PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES TO
REPOSITORIES OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS 1 (2005), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/rporchr.pdf (stating that the overwhelming majority of prosecutors who responded to
this survey claimed that another agency was responsible for reporting dispositions of
cases).
96 Kevin Liptak, Obama Looks Beyond Commutations in Justice Reform Bid, CNN (July 15,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/14/politics/obama-naacp-speech-philadelphia-jus
tice-reform/.
97 Remarks by the President at the NAACP Conference, WHITE HOUSE (July 14, 2015), https:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/remarks-president-naacp-conference
(stating, “our criminal justice system isn’t as smart as it should be” and “[m]ass incarcera-
tion makes our country worse off, and we need to do something about it”); see also Keller,
supra note 16 (explaining that in an attempt to reduce incarceration rates, “Mr. Obama
has proposed reducing the sentences of nonviolent offenders, saying last week that nonvio-
lent drug offenders are ‘the real reason our prison population is so high’” (quoting
Remarks by the President at the NAACP Conference, supra)); Remarks by the President at the NAACP
Conference, supra (“African Americans and Latinos make up 30 percent of our population;
they make up 60 percent of our inmates.  About one in every 35 African American men . . .
is serving time right now.  Among white men, that number is one in 214.”).
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discussion of prison populations or executive objectives to reduce mass incar-
ceration.98  Rather, prosecutors have the latitude to charge a wide range of
crimes and to seek a wide range of penalties as long as the prosecutor
believes the charges and sought-after penalties are “consistent with the
nature of the defendant’s conduct”99 or the likelihood of success at trial is
high, without regard to the incarceration effect of the charges.  This similar
situation happens in other parts of government.  In the same week that a
government report revealed that government detentions of immigrants were
failing on several fronts, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
renewed its contract with the same company that had been accused of
mismanagement.100
Certainly, there are some important counterexamples that demonstrate
areas where the president guides inferior executive officers.  In the immigra-
tion arena, President Obama made it a priority to enforce immigration dur-
ing his term and there were increases in detention of illegal immigrants
during his term, demonstrating coordination by prosecutors.101  Similarly,
President Obama’s focus on enforcing tariffs and the DOJ’s recent statement
to all U.S. attorneys about the more coordinated and strict enforcement of
white-collar crime demonstrate some coordinated guidance.102
But at times, when executive attorneys do receive guidance, it is conflict-
ing.  For instance, guidance from the president and attorneys general in
98 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 81, § 9.
99 Id. § 9-27.300.  When prosecutors decide to charge a crime, the handbook instructs
them to charge “the most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defen-
dant’s conduct, and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction.” Id.  “Most serious
offense” generally means the crime that yields the highest range of incarceration.  But the
handbook also instructs prosecutors to take an “individualized assessment” of each defen-
dant to determine which charges further the “purposes of the criminal law [such] as pun-
ishment, protection of the public, specific and general deterrence, and rehabilitation.” Id.
100 Michael Barajas, ICE Awards Contract to Private Prison Company That Was Just Slammed
in Federal Report, HOUSTONPRESS (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.houstonpress.com/news/ice-
awards-contract-to-private-prison-company-that-was-just-slammed-in-federal-report-7785696;
Mike Lillis, Progressive Rips DHS for Tasking Prison Company with Immigrant Oversight, HILL
(Sept. 23, 2015), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/254648-progressive-rips-dhs-for-
asking-prison-company-to-run-immigrant-oversight (reporting that Rep. Rau´l Grijalva criti-
cized a decision by ICE to award Geo Group, a for-profit prison company, an $11 million-a-
year contract to run a newly launched program to manage immigration cases for families,
announced on the same day that the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued a report on
the treatment of detainees held in Geo Group-managed immigration detention centers).
101 Alejandra Marchevsky & Beth Baker, Why Has President Obama Deported More Immi-
grants than Any President in US History?, NATION (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.thenation
.com/article/why-has-president-obama-deported-more-immigrants-any-president-us-his-
tory/ (“Since taking the oath of office, Obama has deported immigrants at a faster rate
than any other president in US history, nearly a record 2 million people.”).
102 See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy U.S. Attorney Gen., to all U.S.
Attorneys (Sept. 9, 2015) (explaining that fighting corporate fraud is a top priority of the
DOJ and explaining a more coordinated approach by the DOJ on these issues).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 21 21-MAR-17 11:42
2017] subconstitutional  checks 1091
recent years laments increased incarceration rates,103 yet the U.S. Attorney’s
Manual continues to advise prosecutors to bring the highest sentence range
possible in every case.104  Indeed, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual advises prose-
cutors to charge the “most serious offense,” with the highest range under the
Sentencing Guidelines.105  The Manual makes it very clear that mandatory
minimums should be applied whenever applicable, if the defendant does not
enter a plea.106  And even with plea deals, the Manual makes clear that the
defendant should plead to the charge that is the “most serious readily prova-
ble charge.”107  The federal handbook recommends the harshest possible
course, though individual prosecutors retain a wide degree of discretion and
little accountability to fulfill broader executive directives or guidance.108
Indeed, though at the top the president and attorney general demand
decreased incarceration, line federal prosecutors are encouraged to bring
the harshest sentences and as many cases as they can.109  This conflicting
guidance does not provide coordinated executive guidance.
State prosecutors’ offices have even less guidance.  Often these offices
lack any handbook of instructions at all.  In a small pilot study of a mid-size
prosecutors’ office I conducted, there were mixed reviews on whether the
office had a handbook or whether there were procedures for the prosecutors
103 On several occasions, former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder discussed his disap-
proval of the high levels of incarceration and his “Smart on Crime” initiative to reduce the
federal prison population and penalties for low-level, nonviolent drug offenders. See Eric
Holder, Former U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meeting-american-bar-associations; see
also Eric Holder, Former U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at the Fourth Meeting of Ministers
Responsible for Public Security in the Americas (Nov. 21, 3013), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-fourth-meeting-ministers-re
sponsible-public; Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, One Year After
Launching Key Sentencing Reforms, Attorney General Holder Announces First Drop in
Federal Prison Population in More than Three Decades (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.jus
tice.gov/opa/pr/one-year-after-launching-key-setencing-reforms-attorney-general-holder-
annouces-first-drop-0.
104 Cf. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 81, § 9-27.300.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. § 9-27.430.  The handbook directs prosecutors to “assist the sentencing court by:
1. Attempting to ensure that the relevant facts are brought to the court’s attention fully
and accurately; and 2. Making sentencing recommendations in appropriate cases.” Id. § 9-
27.710.  Prosecutors should make a sentencing recommendation when “[t]he terms of a
plea agreement so require it” or when “[t]he public interest warrants an expression of the
government’s view concerning appropriate sentence.” Id. § 9-27.730(A).  When deciding
which charges and sentences to seek, the handbook directs prosecutors to consider
“whether the penalty yielded by such sentencing range (or potential mandatory minimum
charge, if applicable) is proportional to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct, and
whether the charge achieves such purposes of the criminal law as punishment, protection
of the public, specific and general deterrence, and rehabilitation.” Id. § 9-27.300(A).
108 Id. § 9-27.110.
109 Id. § 9-27.300.
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to follow.110  Some attorneys claimed there was a handbook and others
claimed that the office did not have one.  Prosecutors’ opinions also differed
on what they should do in charging similar cases, even within an office.  For
instance, with the same exact simple assault case, the prosecutors (ranging
from veteran to beginner) suggested everything from no charges for the par-
ticular offense to up to 720 days in jail.111  Their survey results echoed what
informal conversations with prosecutors often confirm: that the culture of a
prosecutors’ office,112 the individual in charge of that office, and a prosecu-
tor’s mentor in the office impact the decisions that prosecutor makes more
than any handbook or other guidelines from the executive.113  And state
prosecutors, like federal prosecutors, if they are given instruction, often are
guided by a standard of likelihood of success at trial or a probability of con-
viction.  The standard is not necessarily influenced by the prerogative of the
state executive, or by broader justice goals, allowing prosecutors not to con-
sider the impact their work is having on the larger criminal justice system.
For instance, studies show that guidance and review from the executive can
improve inconsistencies in treatment,114 based on the location of the prose-
cutors’ office,115 race,116 victim characteristics,117 individual district attor-
ney’s office standards,118 sexual orientation,119 and the prosecutor’s
individual moral standards,120 among other factors.  Many of these factors
have little to do with the facts of a particular case, but introduce inconsisten-
cies and potential biases that may be prevented with more executive gui-
dance and review.
110 Results of the study are on file with the author.
111 Id.
112 See generally Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1121 (2012) (discussing the impact that cultures in prosecution offices
have on attorneys and on fulfilling their duties).
113 Results of the study are on file with the author.
114 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 10, at 978; James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial
Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1562 (1981).
115 See generally Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58
STAN. L. REV. 137, 139 (2005); Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial
Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1440
(2004).
116 Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1149–50 (2004).
117 See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary
Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1533 n.154 (2000).
118 Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1029–30 (2005).
119 Michael H. Meidinger, Note, Peeking Under the Covers: Taking a Closer Look at
Prosecutorial Decision-Making Involving Queer Youth and Statutory Rape, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC.
JUST. 421, 421 (2012).
120 Podgor, supra note 117, at 1513–14.
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B. Judicial Checks
The judicial branch should act as a check on the executive branch in
criminal issues, but given the realities of our modern criminal justice system,
it does not.  Indeed, due to the system of pleas that dominates, as discussed
later, there is little role for the courts in the criminal process.  Judges only
review prosecutorial decisions with high standards of appellate review and
rarely punish prosecutors or uphold their role of interpreting and applying
statutes to individual cases.121  Also, criminal defendants cannot use the
courts to bring individual suits against prosecutors due to § 1983 prohibi-
tions.122  And even when courts do take criminal cases—which is rare—on
appeal at the highest levels, the executive branch wins eighty percent of the
time or more.123  And most often it is due to a judicial deference to safety.124
Therefore, there is no robust review of executive branch decisions by the
judiciary.  The remainder of this Section discusses the constitutional checks
that the judiciary has the opportunity to use to check the executive branch.
First, Article III provides for judicial review of criminal cases,125 and
courts have always maintained the role of interpreting and applying statutes
to individual criminal justice cases.  However, the judiciary has ceded this
role almost wholesale.  The judicial branch actively protects the executive
branch from any judicial review or scrutiny in many criminal contexts.
Judges do not have the constitutional authority to dictate an executive’s pol-
icy agenda.126  The judiciary, according to United States v. Cox,127 is not to
interfere with the “discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States
in their control over criminal prosecutions.”128  In adopting this deferential
approach, subsequent decisions have provided that courts cannot compel
prosecutors to file charges,129 that prosecutors are not required to bring
121 See Andrew B. Loewenstein, Judicial Review and the Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion, 38
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351, 372 (2001) (discussing the limited instances in which the judiciary
can review prosecutorial decisions).
122 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 (2009)
(“[T]he ‘same considerations of public policy that underlie’ a prosecutor’s common-law
immunity ‘countenance absolute immunity under § 1983.’” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976))).
123 This is based on my own study of criminal Supreme Court appeals from 1990 to
2010. See Baradaran, supra note 70, at 43.
124 Id. at 17–18 (explaining that the Supreme Court expresses deference to safety—
officer and public—twenty-eight percent of the time it rules against defendants on
appeal).
125 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority . . . .”).
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. III, § 1.
127 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965).
128 Id. at 171.
129 Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380–81 (2d Cir. 1973).
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charges as soon as probable cause has been established,130 that private citi-
zens lack standing against prosecutors who decide not to prosecute,131 that
courts cannot direct prosecutors to select certain charges,132 that
prosecutorial discretion is “not reviewable for a simple abuse of discre-
tion,”133 and that there is no judicial remedy for arbitrary prosecutorial
action.134  Both federal and state courts have found that prosecutorial discre-
tion is protected by separation of powers.135
But at the same time, the judiciary has the constitutional responsibility
of checking executive power and enforcing individual constitutional rights.
For instance, judges should stop convictions where there is not sufficient evi-
dence, discipline prosecutors who hide exculpatory evidence and submit
false witness testimony or evidence, and closely examine police behavior
rather than trust them implicitly when they violate constitutional rights.  But
in the current system, appellate review of prosecutorial decisions is almost
irrelevant because “harmless error” review requires a court to uphold a crimi-
nal conviction unless there is clear misconduct.136  Prosecutors are also
immune from civil suit as government officials, so even clear misconduct is
not punished.137  Cases of prosecutors being punished internally are rare,
and prosecutors often are not punished by another office or by federal or
130 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 791 (1977).
131 Cf. Tonkin v. Michael, 349 F. Supp. 78, 83 (D.V.I. 1972) (holding, inter alia, that
“where the Attorney General exercises his discretion not to have the cause prosecuted by
his office or by anyone else, then the Court should not appoint or accept any proffered
private prosecution”).
132 United States v. Zabawa, 39 F.3d 279, 284 (10th Cir. 1994).
133 United States v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1992).
134 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), overruling United States v. Arm-
strong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1515 (9th Cir. 1995).
135 See, e.g., State v. Kruczek, No. C1-97-2140, 1998 WL 170115, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 14, 1998) (“District courts should only rarely interpose on prosecutorial discretion:
‘Under established separation of powers rules, absent evidence of selective or discrimina-
tory prosecutorial intent, or an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, the judiciary is powerless
to interfere with the prosecutor’s charging authority.’” (quoting State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.
2d 252, 254 (Minn. 1996))); Frenzel v. State, 963 S.W. 2d 911, 916 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998)
(finding a statute violative of the Texas Constitution under the separation of powers doc-
trine because the statute infringed on prosecutorial discretion).  To be clear, most jurisdic-
tions find that separation of powers protections apply to “inherently executive” functions
such as charging and dismissing.  State v. Montiel, 122 P.3d 571, 580–81 (Utah 2005).  This
“does not limit judicial discretion in considering [a plea bargain].” Id.
136 Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L.
REV. 629, 669 (1972) (describing the difficulty in proving prosecutorial misconduct
because if a prosecutor “act[s] at all like a prosecutor . . . (even a vicious, lawless, and
dishonest prosecutor), he apparently remains immune” to discipline); Steven H. Goldberg,
Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 441–42 (1980)
(arguing that the “harmless error” doctrine should not apply to constitutional rights, but
“[c]ourt[s] should adopt a rule of automatic reversal . . . and make [their] judgments in
full light of the undiluted effect of the rules [they] make[ ]”).
137 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (holding that a prosecutor was
immune from civil suit).
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state disciplinary bodies.138  Additionally, individuals have no recourse
through the courts against prosecutors or police as § 1983 bars such suits.139
Police violations of constitutional rights are rarely addressed by the judiciary
as there is a great amount of modern-day deference to the executive to effec-
tively administer the law.140
And where the judiciary has not voluntarily ceded its power to provide
judicial review, due to modern criminal justice adjudication now being pri-
marily done by pleas rather than trial, judges now lack this opportunity. Pros-
ecutors interpret statutes (even in close cases or with vague statutes), and
defendants must often rely on the prosecutor’s interpretation of the law
because they never get the chance to have a judge decide how a statute may
apply to the crime they allegedly committed.141  In 2015, the Supreme Court,
138 See Charlie Savage, Prosecutors Face Penalty in ‘08 Trial of a Senator, N.Y. TIMES (May
24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/us/politics/2-prosecutors-in-case-of-sena
tor-ted-stevens-are-suspended.html (describing how the prosecutors “failed to turn over
information . . . that might have helped Mr. Stevens at his trial” and subjected the prosecu-
tors to suspensions).  In New York, a prosecutor was rebuked by state and federal courts in
six separate trials for his misconduct; four of these cases resulted in reversals.  He was never
disciplined.  Bennett Gershman, How to Hold Bad Prosecutors Accountable: The Case for a Com-
mission on Prosecutorial Misconduct, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast
.com/articles/2015/08/31/how-to-hold-bad-prosecutors-accountable-the-case-for-a-com
mission-on-prosecutorial-conduct.html.  There are also several reports of prosecutorial mis-
conduct in prosecutors who worked under Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes; there
has been no discipline of any prosecutors.  Joaquin Sapien, For Brooklyn Prosecutor, A Troub-
led Last Term, and a Trail of Lingering Questions, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 30, 2013), https://www
.propublica.org/article/for-brooklyn-prosecutor-a-troubled-last-term-and-a-trail-of-linger
ing-quest.
139 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 627 (5th Cir. 2015)
(holding that “prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suit for performing actions asso-
ciated with the judicial process”); see Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427, 431.
140 Baradaran, supra note 70, at 15–20.
141 In oral arguments regarding a case where the appellant claimed a statute was over-
broad, Justice Roberts stated:
[T]he problem is not what the government argues when it gets into court.  The
problem is what the prosecutor threatens when he’s entered into plea bargain
negotiations . . . . You are putting the defense counsel in a position where they
have to interpret the vagueness in making the decision [of] whether they want to
plead to five years or risk the mandatory minimum of . . . 15.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (No.
13–7120).  And in Yates v. United States, the appellant argued that the prosecutors too
broadly interpreted the statute upon which his conviction was based.  Both parties agreed
that the maximum sentence of twenty years for the charge would be too severe for the
appellant’s actions.  In response to the government claiming that U.S. Attorneys are gener-
ally instructed to charge the defendant with the offense that is most severe under the law,
Justice Roberts stated:
[E]very time you get somebody who is throwing fish overboard, you can go to him
and say: Look, if we prosecute you you’re facing 20 years, so why don’t you plead
to a year, or something like that.  It’s an extraordinary leverage that the broadest
interpretation of this statute would give Federal prosecutors.
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in the oral arguments of Johnson v. United States142 and Yates v. United
States,143 highlighted the injustice of prosecutors interpreting statutes while
negotiating pleas, thus demonstrating that the Court may be open to reinvig-
orating subconstitutional checks of the executive and taking back the role of
courts in interpreting criminal statutes.  While some agency decisionmaking
is not reviewable,144 and there are exceptions to FOIA,145 in general other
executive agencies receive more judicial review than criminal agencies.146
But before the APA, the judiciary provided strict judicial review of executive
agencies, but now they exercise deference in the criminal context.147
Second, the judiciary maintains power to check the executive branch
through Brady v. Maryland,148 which should act as a subconstitutional check.
As a result of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brady and its progeny, prosecu-
tors must disclose certain material evidence and information that is favorable
to the accused.149  Courts may nevertheless decline to review a prosecutor’s
Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No.
13–7451).
142 Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (No. 13–7120).
143 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (No. 13–7451).
144 For instance, when the EPA charges many environmental violations, these decisions
are often not reviewable by the judicial branch. See, e.g., Luminant Generation Co., LLC v.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 757 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that notices of violations issued
by the EPA are not judicially reviewable). But see Sackett v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct.
1367, 1373–74 (2012) (explaining that issues are not judicially reviewable when the statute
precludes review, and giving examples of cases in which the Supreme Court enforced this
principle).
145 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(iv) (2012) (“A district court of the United States shall not
have jurisdiction to review an agency denial of expedited processing of a request for
records after the agency has provided a complete response to the request.”); id.
§ 552(a)(4)(A)(vii) (“In any action by a requester regarding the waiver of fees under this
section, the court shall determine the matter de novo: Provided, That the court’s review of
the matter shall be limited to the record before the agency.”).
146 Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 68, at 991 (stating that the APA’s “require-
ments of notice and comment, of separation between law enforcers and adjudicators, and
of judicial review were designed to perform the same functions as the Constitution’s sepa-
ration of powers safeguards” (footnotes omitted)).  However, as Barkow points out, these
requirements are absent in the criminal context. Id. at 1028.
147 After the inception of executive agencies during the New Deal era, the principle of
checks and balances—particularly the idea that it is the judiciary’s job to interpret law, not
the executive’s—was pervasive, leading to courts consistently restraining administrative
agencies’ power.  In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the
Supreme Court moved away from strict judicial review towards granting greater deference
to agencies by establishing a two-part test: (1) if congressional intent is clear, the court and
agency must give effect to it; and (2) if congressional intent is not clear, the court must
determine “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute.”  467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2078–82 (1990) (describing the evolution and providing
examples of judicial review over executive agencies since they were established).
148 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
149 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Bruce A.
Green, Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639, 644
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actions where there is no touchstone to assess abuse or where tradition has
remained silent.150  Moreover, every state has ethical codes of conduct in
place to sanction prosecutors who engage in Brady violations.151  Prosecutors
have a duty to not use improper methods but are required to do every legiti-
mate act to win a conviction.152  However, prosecutors seem to be immune to
discipline when they breach that duty and the courts justify prosecutorial
immunity due to the availability of professional discipline.153  For this reason,
the judiciary tends to allow broad discretion to prosecutors’ judgments,154
and prosecutors almost never face discipline for misconduct or Brady viola-
tions.155  For example, in over 2000 cases from 1970 to 2003 where
prosecutorial misconduct led to dismissals, sentence reductions, or reversals,
prosecutors were disciplined in only forty-four of those cases.156
(2013); see also Baer, supra note 45, at 4 (“Brady and its progeny require prosecutors to
disclose material, exculpatory evidence in time for use at trial or sentencing.”).
150 See, e.g., Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the Prosecutor’s Duty to Search the Intelli-
gence Community for Brady Material, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1494–95 (2003) (noting that
“circuits do not agree whether a prosecutor’s duty to search for Brady material extends to
entities that have no interest in the prosecution, whether the duty extends only to law
enforcement entities, whether it extends only to persons acting under the direction or
control of the prosecutor, and whether the duty extends to Brady material outside a prose-
cutor’s jurisdiction”).  If a court becomes aware of a Brady violation prior to conviction,
available remedies include: exclusion of government evidence, interrupting the proceed-
ings to provide the defense with the opportunity to cross examine a witness with newly
discovered evidence, informing the jury of the government’s failure to hand over certain
evidence, declaring a mistrial, or dismissing the government’s indictment with prejudice.
See Baer, supra note 45, at 14; Green, supra note 149, at 644.
151 Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 715 (1987).
152 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
153 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721,
722 (2001); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (“[A] prosecutor stands
perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights,
in his amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers.”).
154 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 67 (2011) (holding that a prosecutor was
not subject to discipline for failing to comply with Brady because “[a] licensed attorney
making legal judgments, in his capacity as a prosecutor . . . simply does not present . . . [a]
‘highly predictable’ constitutional danger”).
155 See, e.g., Edward M. Genson & Marc W. Martin, The Epidemic of Prosecutorial Courtroom
Misconduct in Illinois: Is It Time to Start Prosecuting the Prosecutors?, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 39, 47
(1987) (citing authorities, and stating that “[d]isciplinary sanctions are rarely imposed
against prosecutors”); David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After Con-
nick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 220 (2011) (citing multiple studies
where prosecutors were not punished for misconduct or Brady violations); Kenneth Rosen-
thal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Juris-
prudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 889 (1998) (“[W]hile the prosecutor is theoretically subject
to disciplinary codes, there is a notable absence of disciplinary sanctions against prosecu-
tors, even in the most egregious cases.”).
156 Keenan et al., supra note 155, at 220.
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While Brady theoretically limits prosecutorial discretion, it is in practical
effect irrelevant.  One study between 1980 and 1986 found only nine
instances (in all fifty states) of disciplinary action against prosecutors for
Brady violations.157  Only in the most egregious cases are prosecutors criti-
cized, or censured, and thus Brady is hardly ever enforced.158  The lack of
judicial discipline of prosecutors for misconduct on Brady grounds exists,
perhaps, for several reasons.  First, prosecutors may justify holding evidence,
believing that it will not ever come to light in a post-conviction claim.159
When undisclosed evidence comes to light, a prosecutor can always argue
that the evidence had no reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of a
trial, and avoid a violation.160  There are also significant problems in bring-
ing a Brady violation to the attention of a disciplinary body.  A defendant or
defense attorney are the most likely persons to file a complaint against a pros-
ecutor for a Brady violation, but due to the fact that defense attorneys and
prosecutors work together regularly and rely on each other to plead cases
and reduce their workload, it is extremely unlikely for a defense attorney to
file a complaint against a prosecutor.161  In larger offices, Brady violations
may be more rampant than in smaller offices where the individual prosecutor
may worry about the reputational concerns of being caught violating the law.
157 Rosen, supra note 151, at 720.
158 See Baer, supra note 45, at 28 (quoting Rosen, supra note 151, at 693 (referring to
Brady as a paper tiger)).
159 Green, supra note 149, at 661–62; see also Janet C. Hoeffel & Stephen I. Singer,
Activating A Brady Pretrial Duty to Disclose Favorable Information: From the Mouths of Supreme
Court Justices to Practice, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 467, 477 (2014) (claiming that
prosecutors are aware that withheld evidence will likely never be discovered, and even if
the evidence is discovered, the defense has the high burden of showing a reasonable
probability that the evidence would have made a difference); Rosen, supra note 151, at
731–32 (noting that the only possible legal consequence of presenting false evidence or
suppressing exculpatory evidence is that the defendant may be fortunate enough to dis-
cover the evidence and file for post-conviction relief).
160 Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 159, at 477 (noting that there are so many unknown
and unknowable variables, including the theory of defense and the evidence the defense
may present); see also Rosen, supra note 151, at 731–32 (noting that a prosecutor can take
added comfort in the development of strict materiality standards and the general trend
towards restricting post-conviction relief in criminal cases).
161 See Rosen, supra note 151, at 733–35 (noting that the relationship between a
defense attorney and prosecutor is typically a continuing one, and sensible defense attor-
neys will understandably hesitate to jeopardize a practice by filing complaints that will have
little chance of resulting in meaningful discipline).  Defendants also rarely file Brady viola-
tions against prosecutors.  Baer, supra note 45, at 25, 28 (noting that “most defendants
plead guilty and therefore skip the information-forcing benefits of a criminal trial.  Crimi-
nal defendants often know less about the government’s case than the government itself,
and their only means for determining the weakness of the government’s case is by proceed-
ing to trial . . . [and] most defendants lack the resources and fortitude to seek this
option . . . . [O]nly in the most egregious cases have prosecutors been publicly criticized,
censured, or disbarred, leading some scholars to conclude that Brady’s primary enforce-
ment mechanism is little more than a ‘paper tiger’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Rosen,
supra note 151, at 693, 696–97, 730–31)).
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Also, depending on the culture of the office, these violations may be wide-
spread or nonexistent, or somewhere in between.
The judicial branch is largely unable to act as a check to executive
power, with the exception of a few situations.  Ironically, the judicial branch
has willingly surrendered its ability to provide meaningful checks.  Courts
have cited both public policy and separation of powers as justifications for
favoring a hands-off approach.162  Ironically, separation of powers, which is
at the core of the constitutional requirement of checks and balances, has
been used to consolidate power in the executive branch rather than maintain
balanced power between the three branches.
There are two instances where courts—at least theoretically—act as a
check on prosecutorial decisions, and both involve the violation of constitu-
tional rights.  The first is selective prosecution, where a prosecutor violates
the Equal Protection Clause by prosecuting an individual with improper
motivation and disparate treatment.163  The second is vindictive prosecution,
where a prosecutor violates the Due Process Clause by charging an individual
with a crime in retaliation for the individual exercising a constitutional or
statutory right.164  In real terms though, courts rarely punish prosecutors for
abusing their discretion, and the Supreme Court requires a standard of
“clear evidence” to displace the “presumption that a prosecutor has acted
lawfully.”165  The clearly erroneous standard is also the majority standard for
vindictive prosecutions.166  Here, again courts ironically defer to prosecutors’
decisionmaking in order to protect separation of powers.
162 Courts have typically relied on two arguments for withholding judicial review of
executive decisions.  The first is a public policy concern.  The Supreme Court in Wayte v.
United States noted that “[t]his broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the
decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.”  470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
Scholars have also supported increased discretion, the “most commonly cited reasons
[being] legislative ‘overcriminalization,’ the need for prosecutors to shepherd limited
resources, and the need for individualized justice.”  Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good
Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 851, 863 (1995) (footnotes omitted).  Second, the Supreme Court has actually
stated that reviewing executive decisions may be a violation of the separation of powers.  In
United States v. Armstrong, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he Attorney General and
United States Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.
They have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President’s delegates
to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed.’”  517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quot-
ing Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; and then quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).  And historically
there have been few judicial checks on any law enforcement agencies or legislators because
“attempts to impose any sort of judicial or administrative review on the great majority of
the decisions of these offices have been grandly unsuccessful.”  Misner, supra note 61, at
736.  As such, courts have historically shown an unwillingness to check executive power.
163 See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608–10.
164 See, e.g., United States v. Stokes, 124 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 1997).
165 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (quoting
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463–65).
166 Teah R. Lupton, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1284 (2002).
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All of this is not to say that prosecutors have completely unlimited
bounds.  On occasion, courts call out prosecutors for abusing their powers.
Recently, in Bond v. United States,167 the Supreme Court chastised the federal
prosecutors who brought charges based on the Chemical Weapons Act
against a woman for using household chemicals to injure her husband’s par-
amour.168  The Court spent ample time in its opinion discussing its concern
with the prosecutors’ conduct.169
Additionally, in United States v. Stevens,170 Chief Justice Roberts
expressed leeriness of overly broad executive discretion.171  In Stevens, the
federal government was defending a statute that outlawed animal crush
videos.172  The Court found that the statute was overbroad because it swept
up a large category of publications.173  The federal government argued that
the statute would only apply to animal crush videos and that federal prosecu-
tors would exercise the appropriate discretion to ensure the statute was not
applied in an overly broad fashion.174  That argument, however, did not sat-
isfy the Court: “The Government hits this theme hard, invoking its
prosecutorial discretion several times.  But the First Amendment protects
against the Government . . . . We would not uphold an unconstitutional stat-
ute merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.”175
Again, here the Court seemed to be questioning its blank check and implicit
trust of executive discretion.
At times the judiciary has stepped in where there are especially egre-
gious instances of violations of constitutional rights.  In Brown v. Plata,176 the
Supreme Court informed the state of California that its incarceration num-
bers were not constitutionally acceptable and violated health standards, and
gave it instructions to reduce numbers quickly.177  And in a recent high-pro-
file account, California courts removed the Orange County District Attor-
ney’s Office from a case where prosecutors allegedly participated in a scheme
that went back as far as thirty years.178  A number of prosecutors in the office
“elicited illegal jailhouse confessions,” failed to turn over favorable evidence
167 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
168 Id. at 2092–93.
169 Id.
170 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
171 Id. at 480.
172 Id. at 465.
173 Id. at 481–82.
174 Id. at 480.
175 Id. (citations omitted).
176 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
177 Id. at 499, 502, 533–36.
178 Editorial, Dishonest Prosecutors, Lots of Them, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/opinion/dishonest-prosecutors-lots-of-them-in-southern-calif
.html?_r=0.
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to defendants, and “lied repeatedly in court.”179  The California court
removed all of the prosecutors from the case.180
Overall, despite the existence of structural constitutional checks by the
judiciary on the executive branch and an ability to enforce individual consti-
tutional rights, courts often refuse to limit the executive power of prosecutors
and police.  The judiciary often refuses to enforce individual constitutional
rights and chooses to defer to the executive and often fails to punish prosecu-
tors for even unconstitutional misconduct and violations of individual rights.
C. Legislative Checks
The legislature has the constitutional power to act as a powerful check to
the enforcement of criminal law, but it has mostly acted to expand executive
power in the criminal context.181  The Constitution vests Congress with all
legislative powers in Article I and grants “extensive authority to oversee and
investigate executive branch activities.”182  The executive has recognized this
power as “beyond dispute” even though it is not explicitly granted in the
Constitution.183  One explicit check in the Federal Constitution of the execu-
tive branch is congressional refusal to appoint an executive officer.  This
check is exercised in practice, as Congress in recent years has routinely
delayed appointing executive or judicial nominees.184  Congress has been
more effective in blocking judicial nominations, and even when blocking
attorney general nominations, they have only been able to block the top
officer.  Congress has no power to stop the ninety-three other federal United
States attorneys all over the country.185  Additionally, as a practical matter,
federal prosecutors across the country are appointed largely by senators in
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 See generally STUNTZ, supra note 19, at 6–8 (arguing the criminal system has become
more centralized, with state legislators and federal judges given increasing power).
182 FREDERICK M. KAISER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
MANUAL 4 (2011); see also Andrew McCanse Wright, Constitutional Conflict and Congressional
Oversight, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 881, 894 (2014) (discussing the relationship between Congress
and the executive, and Congress codifying its oversight responsibility over executive agen-
cies in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946).
183 Scope of Cong. Oversight and Investigative Power with Respect to the Exec. Branch,
9 Op. O.L.C. 60, 60 (1985); see also Wright, supra note 182, at 897.
184 See, e.g., Harry Enten, Obama Has Waited Longer for Cabinet Confirmations than Any
Other Recent President, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 23, 2015), http://fivethirtyeight.com/
datalab/obama-has-waited-longer-for-cabinet-confirmations-than-any-other-recent-presi-
dent/.
185 Executive Office for United States Attorneys, OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa (“The Executive Office for
United States Attorneys (EOUSA) provides executive and administrative support for the 93
United States Attorneys located throughout the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam,
the Marianas Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.”).
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their respective states, rather than by the president.186  Thus, they may feel
beholden to the priorities of their local senator rather than the directives of
the president, the attorney general, or the Department of Justice.187  One
example of this phenomenon is the refusal of federal United States attorney
offices in states that ban the death penalty to seek the death penalty in fed-
eral cases, where it is permitted.188
186 Michael J. Nelson & Ian Ostrander, Keeping Appointments: The Politics of Confirming
United States Attorneys, 37 JUST. SYS. J. 211, 214 (2016) (“[L]ike most federal judicial nomina-
tions, U.S. Attorneys are subject to the blue slip process in which home state senators of
the president’s party are able to recommend (or block) nominations to positions within
their state.”).
187 Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1541,
1558 (2002) (explaining that federal prosecutors “are politically beholden to the state sen-
ator, rather than to the President”); Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57
VAND. L. REV. 783, 865 (2004) (“United States Attorneys are typically beholden to elected
legislative patrons, and legislators are not shy about demanding that federal prosecutors
act to address local needs.”); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delega-
tion, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 789 (1999) (“The process for select-
ing U.S. attorneys . . . has long been recognized as a means through which senators
influence prosecutorial behavior in their respective states—at least when they are members
of the president’s party.”). See generally JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES:
U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 115–16 (1978).  Federal prosecutors
often do not pursue the death penalty in states that do not allow the death penalty.
RACHEL KING, DON’T KILL IN OUR NAMES: FAMILIES OF MURDER VICTIMS SPEAK OUT AGAINST
THE DEATH PENALTY 280 n.3 (2003).  For example, U.S. District Judge J.P. Stadtmueller in
the Eastern District of Wisconsin told a defendant at his sentencing hearing that he “was
fortunate he was not tried in Illinois for [his murders], where he could have faced the
death penalty.”  Dave Daley, Biker Gets Life Sentences in Mchenry Slayings, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 13,
2000), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-10-13/news/0010130357_1_outlaws-
murders-life-sentences.  United States Attorneys also feel pressure from senators to bring
charges against an adverse political party.  For example, David Iglesias, former United
States Attorney from New Mexico, was pressured by then-New Mexico U.S. Senator, Pete
Domenici, to further investigate public corruption allegations against Democrats, and
bring voter fraud charges before the November presidential election. U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006, at 53, 166
(2008), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0809a/final.pdf.  Iglesias did not follow his state’s
senator’s request, and was subsequently removed as a U.S. Attorney. Id. at 53.  “Iglesias
testified that he believed he was removed as U.S. Attorney because he failed to respond to
[Domenici’s] desire to rush public corruption prosecutions.” Id.
188 In 1988, the federal government reenacted the death penalty for federal cases.  Rory
K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s
Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 349 (1999).  Prior to 2000, none of the states that banned
the death penalty allowed a federal defendant to receive a death sentence. See, e.g., Rich-
ard A. Serrano et al., At Justice, Life-and-Death Frictions, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2007), http://
articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/26/nation/na-death26; Patricia Wen, Prosecutors Often Balk
at Capital Cases, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 15, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/
03/14/some-federal-prosecutors-reluctant-bring-capital-punishment-cases/zl9XailNK05grk
bBDXABBP/story.html.
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Another legislative check on the executive is impeachment of a federal
officer for misconduct.189  Impeachment is not a real solution to the prob-
lem of wide-scale prosecutorial misconduct because at most, Congress could
impeach the head prosecutor, or the attorney general.190  This is extremely
rare.
Another check on the state level is elections for prosecutors.  This check
is not effective in practice because elections are often pro forma, do not set
policy for prosecutors, and lack transparency for voters to decide whether the
individual shares their priorities.  The United States is unique in that most
chief prosecutors are elected into office.191  In fact, all but five states elect
their prosecutors at the local level.192  When one individual has the discre-
tion on what type, and which crimes to prosecute, accountability is impor-
tant.193  Sadly, however, a national sample of outcomes in prosecutor
elections reveals that incumbent prosecutors rarely face real accountabil-
ity.194  The evidence from a recent national survey of prosecutors shows that
the average number of years in office for the chief prosecutor is nine and a
half years.195  Moreover, ninety-five percent of the incumbents who want to
return to prosecutorial office are reelected.196  Of those prosecutors that are
reelected, eighty-five percent of the general campaigns in which they run are
uncontested.197  Because incumbent prosecutors often run unopposed, the
incumbent prosecutor will win “automatic reelection” without having to
explain her decisions to voters in a competitive atmosphere.198  One reason
for the lack of challengers is explained by the nature of the prosecutorial job.
A challenger who unsuccessfully runs against an incumbent is likely already
189 High Crimes and Misdemeanors, CONST. RIGHTS FOUND., http://www.crf-usa.org/
impeachment/high-crimes-and-misdemeanors.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2017).
190 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (granting Congress the power to impeach the president, the
vice president, and all civil officers of the United States).
191 Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 S.M.U. L. REV. 593, 593 (2014).
192 Id. at 598–99 (“[E]ven in the five exceptional states . . . voters select prosecutors at
one level removed.”).
193 Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 582
(2009) (noting that the methods available for checking the work of prosecutors deserve
our close attention and quoting the American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal
Justice that “prosecutor[s] ‘may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with
the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist
which would support a conviction’” (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N, A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.9(b) (3d ed. 1993))).
194 Id. (noting that prosecutors hardly lose reelections).
195 Wright, supra note 191, at 600 (“[O]nly 36% of offices have leaders with less than
five years in office.”).
196 Id. at 604 (noting that even in the largest and most competitive jurisdictions ninety
percent of incumbents are reelected and that the typical incumbent prosecutor will not
have to explain their performance to voters).
197 Wright, supra note 193, at 593; see also Wright, supra note 191, at 601 (claiming that
over eighty percent of prosecutor incumbents ran unopposed in both general and primary
elections).
198 See Wright, supra note 193, at 596.
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employed by the incumbent, or a defense attorney practicing within the
incumbent’s jurisdiction.199  This puts challengers to a prosecutor in an awk-
ward position and the incumbent prosecutor in a position of extreme
power.200
Even in prosecutorial elections that may be contested, the information
provided by candidates often does little to effectively educate the public.201
Prosecutorial candidates tend to focus mainly on individual qualifications,
rather than the performance of the office they oversee.202  The work of a
prosecutor is focused on criminal justice, so in theory, the office could
inform the public on how effective the office has been at making the public
safer and combatting crime.203  Moreover, under the current plea bargaining
system, it is nearly impossible for a voter to understand all the factors that
determine why a prosecutor may have decided to prosecute or not prosecute
a given case.204  Certainly, if judges are not privy to this insider information
on case dispositions, the public has no access at all.
In some areas, the legislative branch does act as a check, at least when it
comes to institutional problems with incarceration.  For instance, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission (an independent body that serves to provide infor-
mation to all three branches) approached the DOJ to talk about reducing the
Sentencing Guidelines by two levels for all substances, across the board.  The
sentence reduction became effective November 1, 2014, through Amend-
ment 782 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, often referred to as “Drugs
Minus Two.”205  In effect, drug trafficking offenses are reduced by two levels
on the Drug Quantity Table, which means lower guideline ranges for drug
trafficking offenses.206  Moreover, the Sentencing Commission reduced drug
sentences this last year for a substantial number of federal prisoners as the
199 See Wright, supra note 191, at 603–04 (noting that a challenger working for the
incumbent is likely to not get further promotions or meaningful assignments and a
defense attorney is likely to face less cooperation in plea negotiations).
200 See Wright, supra note 193, at 596.
201 See id. at 602 (“The candidates talk a great deal about last year’s notorious case.
Sometimes the challenger criticizes the incumbent for an overly aggressive investigation in
a newsworthy case, such as a political corruption investigation; or perhaps the point of
contention involves the failure to bring charges in a big case, or the poor conduct of a trial,
or a plea bargain or acquittal that disposed of the charges.  Again, this common type of
claim offers the voter no real guidance to evaluate the work of the prosecutor.  Given the
randomness in the strength of evidence and other events at trial, an outcome in one big
case tells us little about the quality of prosecution work more generally.”).
202 Wright, supra note 191, at 604.
203 Wright, supra note 193, at 602 (noting that resorting to claims about character pro-
vides less information than a discussion about how the prosecutor’s office would operate).
204 See Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 78
(2011) (noting that nearly all of the reasons for a prosecutorial decision are carefully kept
secret).
205 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AMENDMENT TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1 (2014),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amend-
ments/20140718_RF_Amendment782.pdf.
206 Id.
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amendment had a retroactive effect.207  Also, Congress is working on the
Smarter Sentencing Act to reduce sentencing of federal defendants and
incarceration rates, particularly for drug offenders.208
There are three other implicit structural checks that could help the leg-
islative branch rein in the power of the executive enforcement arm.  First,
and importantly, the criminal justice system is set up in an adversarial man-
ner with winners and losers.  However, the way it is operated is one where
“battle” or trial never occurs.  The conflicts are all resolved with negotiations
where defendants lack little power if they do not want to risk trial or a longer
sentence.  The legislature, rather than protecting defendants, has continued
to increase mandatory minimums in sentencing and provide an aggressive
federal criminal code to give prosecutors more tools to use against criminal
defendants.
Second, federal and state sentencing guidelines bolster prosecutorial
power.209  Federal prosecutors act as the primary sources to trigger applica-
tion of the guidelines.210  In some states, courts can move sentences down to
misdemeanors under certain provisions.211  Prosecutors also maintain the
sole power to provide downward departures.212  In recent years, sentencing
guidelines have grown more complex, and with more complexity and more
harsh guidelines, prosecutors gain more power.213
Third, aggressive federal criminal statutes and state tough-on-crime legis-
lation expand prosecutorial power.  It is a well-known phenomenon among
criminal experts that state criminal codes continually expand—imposing
more harsh sentences for the same crimes and enacting new laws, which
essentially punish already punishable offenses.214  Prosecutors often have
options of several felonies and misdemeanors to charge for any single infrac-
207 Id.
208 Jeremy Haile, Bipartisan Moment for Drug Sentencing Reform, HILL: CONGRESS BLOG
(Mar. 19, 2015, 7:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/236155-
bipartisan-moment-for-drug-sentencing-reform (stating that the legislation, if passed,
“would reduce inflexible mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses,” “give judges
greater discretion in sentencing,” and “would extend the sentencing provisions of the 2010
crack cocaine law retroactively to certain prisoners sentenced under the old law, allowing
them to petition courts for sentence reductions consistent with public safety”).
209 Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1337 (2005); see also Steven P. Grossman, An Honest
Approach to Plea Bargaining, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 101, 111 (2005); Marc L. Miller, Domina-
tion & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1253 (2004); Kate Stith,
The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420,
1422 (2008).
210 Bowman, supra note 209, at 1336–37.
211 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18 (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402 (West
2016).
212 Bowman, supra note 209, at 1337.
213 See id. at 1340.
214 Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 224–25 (2007)
(commenting on the pervasive scholarly belief, but ultimately disagreeing); see also Stuntz,
supra note 2, at 531–32 (noting how a notorious murder during a carjacking led politicians
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tion or crime.  The range of punishment for a single minor act can include
probation up to two years in prison.  And the range for more serious crimes
can be equally large and provide a lot of discretion.  A prosecutor often
enters a plea negotiation with a list of felonies and misdemeanors with which
she can charge a defendant, and has a lot of bargaining power.  Some federal
statutes allow stacking of crimes against certain defendants, like drug defend-
ants who possess a gun.215  On the other hand, appropriation riders at the
federal level prohibit spending money against people violating state drug
laws, for instance, and act as a legislative check.216  Despite this small check,
it is the consensus among criminal justice experts that too many ordinary,
functioning members of society that do not need to be incarcerated are
processed through prisons.217
Empirical evidence certainly supports the argument that legislatures
have incentives to expand offenses and enact more severe punishments.218
Often, these statutes come about when high-profile, atrocious crimes are
to create carjacking laws even though existing criminal laws—auto theft, robbery, assault,
kidnapping, and homicide—already criminalized the relevant behavior).
215 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012); see also Molly Booth, Comment, Sentencing Discretion at
Gunpoint: How to Think About Convictions Underlying § 924(c) Mandatory Minimums, 77 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1739, 1741–53 (2010) (discussing the history of § 924(c)); Christopher L.
Robbins, Note, Double-Barreled Prosecution: Linking Multiple Section 924(c) Violations to a Single
Predicate Offense, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1577, 1579, 1581–83 (1996) (discussing whether multiple
§ 924(c) violations may be linked to a single predicate offense).
216 See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (blocking the Department of Justice from spending
money to prevent medical marijuana states from implementing their laws); see also Alex
Kreit, The 2015 Federal Budget’s Medical Marijuana Provision: An “End to the Federal Ban on
Marijuana” or Something Less than That?, 35 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 537, 545–46 (2015) (question-
ing whether Pub. L. No. 113-235 actually curbs federal medical marijuana regulation).
217 See generally HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET
THE INNOCENT (2009) (commenting on the danger posed by vague and cumbersome crimi-
nal statutes that punish seemingly innocuous behavior); see also Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors
and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political Dynamics and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 453, 461–63 (2009) (highlighting three ways in which prosecutors exploit over-
criminalization: criminalization of conduct that few people think is morally wrong, exces-
sive punishment attached to uncontroversial criminal statutes, and redundant statutes that
prohibit conduct that is already criminalized); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich
Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102 (2013) (com-
menting on the problem of prosecutorial discretion when virtually any American bears the
risk of being targeted for prosecution).
218 Brown, supra note 214, at 232 (noting that scholars argue that “majority preferences
lean strongly and consistently in favor of expanded offenses and more severe punish-
ment”); see also Stuntz, supra note 2, at 530 (“Voters may know little about criminal law
doctrine, but they presumably have some idea of the set of results they would like to see:
conviction and punishment of people who commit the kinds of offenses that voters fear.
Legislators, one can fairly hypothesize, have an interest in producing those results (or at
least taking credit for them), so that voters will continue to support them.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Gregory S. Schneider, Note, Sentencing Proportionality in the States, 54 ARIZ. L. REV.
241, 244 (2012) (noting that politicians perceive toughness on crime as politically
advantageous).
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committed.219  Expanding offenses and implementing severer punishment is
how legislators show voters that they are tough on crime and that the prob-
lem has been addressed.220
Congress and state legislatures could require subconstitutional checks
that allow more strenuous requirements for plea bargaining and rein in legis-
lation that provides prosecutors with too much power to charge defendants.
This would help act as a necessary check on the executive and may protect
from violating the nondelegation principle.221  Abdication of criminal policy
by legislators to the sole duty of the executive may violate the nondelegation
principle, if statutes are left vague.222  In such situations, prosecutors are free
to carry out the law as they see fit or to direct their actions as close to the
intent of a statute as possible.
* * *
This Part has provided a brief snapshot of the holes in executive, judi-
cial, and legislative checks on the criminal justice system.  Criminal enforce-
ment has very few structural checks that function to limit the power of the
executive.  This Part further demonstrated that subconstitutional checks—in
any branch—are either absent or anemic in criminal justice.  And with the
help of draconian statutory schemes in the federal and state systems, the
219 See Pizzi, supra note 16, at 207–08 (“[T]he killing of Jenna Grieshaber in New York
by a parolee led to the passage of ‘Jenna’s law,’ which requires that those convicted of
violent offenses serve eighty-five percent of their maximum sentence before becoming eli-
gible for parole.  ‘Jessica’s law,’ increased sentences for sex offenses in Florida (and
inspired similar legislation in many other states) after a nine-year old was abducted, raped,
and killed in that state.  Finally, the horrific murder of Polly Klaas, a twelve-year old drag-
ged at knifepoint from a slumber party at her mother’s home, paved the way in California
for the passage of the so-called ‘three strikes’ law in that state which mandated a life sen-
tence upon a third conviction.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Stuntz, supra note 2, at
531–32 (“In 1992, a Maryland woman and her one-year-old daughter had their car
hijacked; the mother was killed in the course of the theft.  The story made national head-
lines and created the (mistaken) impression that these ‘carjacking’ cases were common.
The public demanded that politicians solve this new problem, notwithstanding that
existing criminal laws—auto theft, robbery, assault, kidnapping, and homicide—already
covered the relevant behavior.  Given any combination of those crimes, offenders could be
both convicted and given very severe sentences.  In such cases, legislatures tend to create
new crimes not to solve the problem, but to give voters the sense that they are doing
something about it.  This happened with carjacking at both the state and federal levels; the
result was a series of new criminal statutes that are almost never invoked, but that served as
means of making politically valuable symbolic statements to voters.” (footnotes omitted)).
220 See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 525 (“Public concern about crime and public demand
that something be done about it are natural.  There are two natural legislative responses:
harsher punishment and larger law enforcement budgets.  One can readily imagine why
legislatures are slow to seize on the second of these options—it costs money.”).
221 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 413 (2008).
222 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (holding
that Congress cannot delegate its Article I legislative powers to other branches and must
articulate an intelligible principle for the executive to administer a statute).
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executive branch and legislative branch have worked seamlessly to charge
many Americans for a wide variety of crimes, and have largely settled these
cases with pleas that never see the light of judicial review.  The judiciary—
except in the 1960s when it dutifully enforced defendants’ constitutional
rights—has abdicated its judicial function of providing constitutional review
in criminal cases.  The next Part focuses more closely on the dysfunction
resulting from the lack of structural checks in criminal justice, particularly
using a case study of the prosecutor.
II. THE PROSECUTOR PROBLEM
The constitutional gap that is the focus of this Article is the lack of ade-
quate checks from the three branches in criminal law.  One way to demon-
strate this gap is with what I refer to as the “Prosecutor Problem.”  It is
manifested in that prosecutors have no real checks imposed on them from
any of the branches.  The members of the executive primarily responsible for
enforcing the law include the police officer and prosecutor.  The prosecutor,
after consultation with a police officer, is the person who determines whether
there will be a criminal case.  Prosecutors—in particular—are the key to
criminal justice.  They decide without any transparency whether to initiate
criminal proceedings, who and what crimes to charge, and how and when to
bring the charges.  Prosecutors have broader discretion than any actor in the
criminal justice system and very little constitutional oversight.  Judges rou-
tinely rubber-stamp prosecutor plea requests, rarely discipline them for mis-
conduct, use the most lenient judicial review, and often agree with sentences
suggested by the government.223  The legislature sets very few statutory limits
on prosecutors (unlike administrative agencies that have multiple statutes
that guide their actions) and often expands their power by enacting more
draconian statutes each term and providing mandatory minimums.224  Even
prosecutors that face elections are often chosen pro forma and without oppo-
sition or consideration of whether they are enforcing laws or reducing crime.
The executive branch provides even less of a check on prosecutors as there is
little guidance from the top or electoral accountability, and advisory manuals
are either ignored or do not exist in independent offices that act as silos.
Moreover, there is little public transparency with a prosecutor’s decisions, as
often little information is released about the charging and negotiation prac-
tices of the many prosecutors’ offices across the country.  Defense counsel
are an internal check but often are criticized for failing to stand up to
prosecutorial power because they lack the power to negotiate and have seri-
ous incentives to work amicably with the prosecutor.225
223 ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 8
(2007).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 56 (“[T]he balance of power in the criminal justice system [is] tilted . . . in
favor of prosecutors.”); Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of
Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 299 (2004) (discussing
how prosecutors and defense counsel work together but do not necessarily work for the
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As important as the prosecutor’s decision is, this is a decision that has
few real constitutional checks.  Several scholars have written about the Prose-
cutor Problem recently and some have suggested solutions.226  All of the
solutions have in different ways suggested that prosecutors should have less
discretion227 and more transparency in their decisionmaking.228  None of
the branches of government—the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches—provide substantial oversight in criminal law, including for
prosecutorial decisions.229  This is particularly a problem in criminal justice
best result in each individual case because “[d]efendants have incentives to fight for the
lowest possible sentence, whereas prosecutors may be pushing not to maximize sentences
but rather to dispose of their dockets efficiently.  Thus . . . prosecutors have no personal
stake in stiff sentences and can lessen their workloads by agreeing to lighter dispositions”).
226 See Pfaff, supra note 15, at 38 (asserting that prosecutors’ decisionmaking is “the
least transparent part of the criminal justice system” and “[p]rosecutors’ offices are to a
large extent empirical black boxes”); see also Irwin Schwartz, Toward Improving the Law and
Policy of Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 119 (2014) (argu-
ing for statutory amendments to “mak[e] more transparent the manner in which decisions
are made by prosecutors”). See generally Nicci Lovre-Laughlin, Lethal Decisions: Examining
the Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Capital Cases in South Dakota and the Federal Justice System,
50 S.D. L. REV. 550, 574 (2005) (discussing prosecutors’ discretion at the federal and state
level in capital punishment cases, and stating that “[c]ourt rulings have put limits on the
discretionary powers of the sentencing body but left prosecutorial discretion unregu-
lated. . . . [I]ndividual states such as South Dakota must be mindful of the potentially
arbitrary factors that may impact a prosecutor’s decision related to seeking the death pen-
alty” (footnotes omitted)); Reynolds, supra note 217, at 102 (discussing how there is a
problem with the amount of discretion allotted to prosecutors and further discussing the
need to limit that discretion as “[p]rosecutorial discretion poses an increasing threat to
justice”).
227 See Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762,
770 (2016) (“Our system depends heavily on trust in prosecutors to do the right thing.”);
Jack M. Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & SOC. SCI. 99, 109, 112
(1976); Stuntz, supra note 2, at 547–48 (discussing the process of institutional competition
and cooperation between prosecutors and legislators that create strong pressure to expand
harsher laws); Vorenberg, supra note 114, at 1521 (noting that prosecutors have a large
amount of discretion in deciding whom to prosecute and deciding how much punishment
to allocate to a particular defendant).
228 See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888–89 (2006)
(discussing the role of transparency); Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-
Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 185–87 (2014) (stating that the general view is that
transparency is beneficial in political decisionmaking but presents a more complicated pic-
ture); see also Andrea Prat, The Wrong Kind of Transparency, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 862 (2005)
(talking about the difference between transparency of actions and consequences).  And in
general, transparency is seen as a good thing in many fields. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein,
Toward More Parsimony and Transparency in “The Essentials of Marriage”, 2011 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 83, 138–39 (asking for more transparency in family law); Ross E. Cheit, Tort Litigation,
Transparency, and the Public Interest, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 232, 283–84 (2008) (ask-
ing for more transparency in torts); Fenster, supra, at 936–37 (touting the benefits of trans-
parency in the administrative context); Note, Mechanisms of Secrecy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1556,
1557–58 (2008) (discussing the problems of secrecy in a principal-agent relationship).
229 There are limited judicial checks on prosecutorial decisionmaking.  For example,
prosecutors cannot engage in selective prosecution or vindictive prosecution. See, e.g.,
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because the branches of government often have unified interests—i.e., get-
ting criminals—so separation of powers is not alone sufficient.230  The only
explicit constitutional checks in criminal justice are the individual constitu-
tional rights that defendants possess.231
The result of the Prosecutor Problem is unchecked power, which has the
potential for abuse.  One result is actual instances of abuse.  Judge Kozinski
recently stated that abuse of the law by prosecutors has reached “epidemic
proportions.”232  These abuses may include overcharging crimes,233 bias
against minorities,234 gender bias,235 plea bargaining abuses,236 vindictive-
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (explaining that deciding to prosecute
“may not be ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification’” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978))); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28–29 (1974) (holding that increasing punish-
ment upon retrial for reasons of vindictiveness is a violation of due process).
230 Rachel Barkow has argued insightfully that there was a lack of institutional checks in
criminal law and pointed to a reinvigoration of separation of powers to compensate for
this.  Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 68, at 990 (advocating for a “more stringent
enforcement of the separation of powers in criminal cases, where it is most needed.  This
approach would lead to different outcomes in the Court’s major separation of powers cases
dealing with criminal matters and would result in a rethinking of its acceptance of unre-
viewable prosecutorial discretion over charging and plea bargaining” (emphasis omitted)).
While I agree wholeheartedly with her diagnosis of the problem, I do not believe that
separation of powers is sufficient in criminal law since the interests of the branches are too
often aligned.  Barkow contributes to this analysis by recognizing that pervasiveness of plea
bargaining and the lack of strict enforcement of individual rights by courts and harsh legis-
lation are a problem, but she does not address this problem on a state level and mostly
argues that a flexible balancing test should not be used in criminal matters.  I argue
instead that intrabranch subconstitutional checks are necessary to avoid the lack of checks
in criminal law because it is unlikely that the branches will cede power to the other
branches, but they may agree to intrabranch checks.
231 Id. at 993 (“The only safeguards come from the individual rights provisions of the
Constitution, but those checks act as poor safeguards against structural abuses and
inequities.”).
232 Judge Kozinski commented that suppression of evidence by prosecutors “ha[s]
reached epidemic proportions.”  United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631, 632 (9th Cir.
2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing harsh consequences for prosecutors are critical to
curb the problem of Brady violations); see also Gershman, supra note 138 (“One of the most
pervasive violations, depicted in numerous cases including each of the above cases, involves
a prosecutor hiding evidence that might prove a defendant’s innocence.”).
233 Alschuler, supra note 51, at 85 (arguing the rise of plea bargaining incentivizes pros-
ecutors to overcharge).
234 Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1465, 1466 (2002) (stat-
ing that these decisions shape the identities of both defendants and victims); Abbe Smith,
Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 368–69 (2001)
(observing that African Americans account for an incredibly disproportionate amount of
the prison population); Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1525 (1988)
(presenting empirical studies that indicate that minority defendants because of their race
and the race of their alleged victims “receive disproportionately harsher treatment at each
stage of the prosecutorial decisionmaking process”).
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ness,237 coercive dismissals,238 immunity violations,239 wrongful confes-
sions240 and convictions,241 coercing witnesses,242 offering perjured
testimony,243 inconsistent sentences,244 and failing to disclose exculpatory
evidence.245  Many others have described the rampant prosecutorial miscon-
235 BRUCE FREDERICK & DON STEMEN, THE ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF
PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING—TECHNICAL REPORT iii, 5 (2012) (“While prosecutorial
discretion is generally seen as very broad and unconstrained, prosecutors often rely on a
fairly limited array of legal and quasi-legal factors to make decisions, and their decision
making is further constrained by several contextual factors.”); Terance D. Miethe, Charging
and Plea Bargaining Practices Under Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic
Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155, 175–76 (1987) (discussing that
“[e]ven when sentencing guidelines do not explicitly regulate prosecutorial discretion,
various mechanisms of social control still operate to limit its use and possible abuse,” but
results of a study showed that Minnesota guidelines “have been a successful experiment in
criminal justice reform”).
236 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970) (holding that a plea deal agreed to
out of fear of the death penalty is still valid); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747
(1970) (holding that a guilty plea need not be invalidated because fear of imposition of the
death penalty was a factor in the plea).
237 United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384 (1982) (holding that a prosecutor’s
decision to charge more seriously on retrial violates due process rights if the decision is
motivated by vindictiveness).
238 See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1987); MacBoyle v. City of
Parma, 383 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding no prosecutorial misconduct regarding
arrestee’s release-dismissal agreement); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U.
PITT. L. REV. 393, 408 (1992).
239 Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 12 (1987) (holding that the defendant’s breach of
a plea agreement removed the prosecution’s bar of double jeopardy); United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 564 (1976) (a prosecutor failing to give a defendant his Miranda
rights prior to his testifying before a grand jury is not grounds for suppression of
testimony).
240 Wilson v. Lawrence Cty., 154 F.3d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1998) (describing the pardon
of an innocent man who was coerced into a wrongful confession that led to eight years of
imprisonment). See generally Gail Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The
Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719 (1997) (citing
other examples of wrongful confessions).
241 See generally Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 291–92; Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 399, 401 (discussing the “recurrent issue of prosecutorial misconduct as a
factor leading to wrongful convictions”).
242 See Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institu-
tional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999,
1007 (2009).
243 Id.
244 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from
Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 211 (2004)
(“The emphasis on investigation, coupled with the federal prosecutor’s power to arrange
guilty pleas, can easily result in inconsistent sentences.”).
245 O’Brien, supra note 242, at 1008.
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duct and the failure of courts to intervene.246  In my own pilot study of a mid-
size prosecutors’ office,247 discussed below, the prosecutors demonstrated a
few of these problems of discretion, including inconsistent sentences and
overcharging of crimes.
A second result of the Prosecutor Problem is that the sheer number of
charges is increasing, which has led to mass incarceration.  Prosecutors are
charging more people with more felonies for longer periods of time.  Accord-
ing to recent studies, prosecutors are the single greatest cause of mass incar-
ceration in America, without concomitant decreases in crime rates.248
Increasing numbers of charges and requests for longer sentences by prosecu-
tors account for major spikes in prison rates.249
This Part first discusses alarming trends in prosecutorial charging, which
demonstrate that prosecutors are a large contributing factor to mass incarcer-
ation.  This is relevant not just to support that there is a live problem with
prosecutors in America, but also to demonstrate that the lack of structural
checks has real impacts in criminal law.  Both federal and state systems have
witnessed dramatic increases in criminal filings over the last few decades.
The lack of constitutional checks has enabled this problem to grow out of
control.  Second, this Part describes the plea bargaining problem as a con-
tributing factor to mass incarceration and a lack of separation of powers.  All
of these are symptoms of the lack of structural constitutional checks on pros-
ecutors.  This Part also demonstrates broadly the dysfunction resulting in
criminal justice when executive power is not checked.
A. Federal and State Filing Trends
This Section simply describes the increase in filings in federal and state
courts.  What this Section is noticeably missing is a data-backed explanation
as to why prosecutors are bringing more state and federal charges now than
they have historically.  What we do know, though, is that prosecutors’ deci-
sionmaking processes are largely unknown to the public.  It is often referred
to as the “black box”250 of criminal justice.  How prosecutors decide whether
to charge individuals, which individuals to charge, and what charges to bring
246 See Editorial, supra note 178 (citing examples of prosecutors “break[ing] the rules
to win a conviction” but never facing punishment for it); Editorial, Rampant Prosecutorial
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/opinion/sun-
day/rampant-prosecutorial-misconduct.html (stating that “far too rarely do courts hold
[prosecutors] accountable” for failing to fulfill their constitutional duties). See generally
Sonja B. Starr, Using Sentencing to Clean Up Criminal Procedure: Incorporating Remedial Sentence
Reduction into Federal Sentencing Law, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 29, 30–31 (2008) (recognizing
that courts fail to intervene when faced with prosecutorial misconduct and offering solu-
tions, such as sentence reduction, to “serve as an effective deterrent remedy”).
247 Specific information about the office will not be made public due to the agreement
made with the office.  It is a prosecutors’ office of fewer than 150 attorneys.
248 See Pfaff, Micro and Macro Causes, supra note 22.
249 Id.
250 BRIAN D. JOHNSON, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE MISSING LINK: EXAMINING
PROSECUTORIAL DECISION-MAKING ACROSS FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 1 (2014) (quoting
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is a mystery to those outside of a particular office.  Instruction given to prose-
cutors on charging is also unwritten and a mystery to those outside of the
office.  However, as discussed in Part I, this Article focuses on the theoretical
and structural reasons why prosecutors are bringing additional charges.  Part
I discusses additional crimes created by a tough-on-crime legislature,
mandatory sentencing guidelines, a deferential judiciary and the decline of
constitutional criminal rights enforcement, the growth and dominance of
plea negotiations, and pro forma prosecutor elections.  Not surprisingly,
after the other branches have deferred, criminalized, or encouraged prosecu-
tion, the one entity tasked with the job, and not beholden to anyone, went
ahead and did what it was encouraged to do.  Indeed, the combination of
these factors provides a plausible explanation as to why prosecutors may be
bringing more charges today than they historically ever have.  This provides
all the more support for the necessity of the other branches checking execu-
tive power.
1. Federal Filings
Federal prosecutors are prosecuting more cases today than even ten
years ago.  In 2012, United States Attorneys received 163,831 criminal mat-
ters, of which 23,424 were declined for, inter alia, evidentiary purposes, lack
of criminal intent, prosecution by another authority, agency request, and
minimal federal interest.251  Thus, only 14% of cases were disposed of with-
out the filing of charges.  In 2002, 31.2% of criminal matters received were
disposed of for those same reasons.252  These numbers indicate that in 2012,
federal prosecutors entertained about 15% more cases than they did in 2002.
Federal prosecutors also bring a larger number of charges now than they
did ten years ago.  In 2002, 56,658 charges were filed, which represented a
6% increase from the year before.253  In 2012, United States Attorneys filed
63,118 charges.254  Thus, in 2012, federal prosecutors filed 6460 more
charges then ten years previously.  Again, prosecutors are filing more charges
now than ten years ago.
As presented by Figure 1 below, the high-water mark for federal filings
over the last ten years was in 2011 when United States Attorney’s offices filed
Lauren O’Neill Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions: Examining Prosecutorial
Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District Courts, 2009 JUST. Q. 1, 2).
251 OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 6, 85 (2012) [hereinafter DOJ EXEC.
OFFICE STATISTICS 2012], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2013/
10/28/12statrpt.pdf.
252 See id. at 6–7; see also EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 6–7 (2002)
[hereinafter DOJ EXEC. OFFICE STATISTICS 2002], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/usao/legacy/2006/09/21/02_stat_book.pdf (explaining that of the 109,173 criminal
matters received in 2002, the U.S. Attorneys’ offices declined 34,115 matters).
253 DOJ EXEC. OFFICE STATISTICS 2002, supra note 252, at 8.
254 DOJ EXEC. OFFICE STATISTICS 2012, supra note 251, at 6.
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68,926 charges.255  Prior to 2011, there was a relative increase from one year
to the next, with 2009 and 2010 fairly indicating the apex reached in 2011.256
It is possible that the high numbers over the past few years could be indica-
tive of presidential policy as reflected by the United States Attorney General.
Vice President Joe Biden swore in Eric Holder on February 3, 2009.257  It is
possible that this spike represents Attorney General Holder’s prosecutorial
approach, or President Obama’s approach, to criminal manners.  However,
ironically, President Obama and Holder himself decried the number of
minorities who were incarcerated when their prosecutors increased the num-
ber of charges each year, and spoke repeatedly during this same period
about how incarceration rates needed to be cut.258  And while the DOJ—
likely under the directive of the President—did create policies that
encouraged a less harsh approach to drug prosecutions,259 overall federal
criminal filings did not decrease.260
255 EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 8 (2013) [hereinafter DOJ EXEC. OFFICE
STATISTICS 2013], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2014/09/22/
13statrpt.pdf.
256 Id.
257 Carrie Johnson, Holder Sworn in as Attorney General, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/03/AR20090203009
97.html.
258 Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Seeks to Curtail Stiff Drug Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/us/justice-dept-seeks-to-curtail-stiff-drug-
sentences.html (citing Attorney General Holder’s statements regarding the need to reduce
incarceration rates).  However, that does not explain the dip in 2012. See DOJ EXEC.
OFFICE STATISTICS 2013, supra note 255, at 8.  There is likely another force that drove filings
to a four-year low in that year.
259 Savage, supra note 258 (stating that the DOJ decided to stop pursuing mandatory
minimum sentences for certain low-level, nonviolent drug offenders).
260 Filings were 56,658 in FY02, 59,998 in FY03, 61,443 in FY04, 60,062 in FY05, 58,702
in FY06, 59,228 in FY07, 63,042 in FY08, 67,864 in FY09, 68,591 in FY10, 68,926 in FY11,
and 63,118 in FY12. DOJ EXEC. OFFICE STATISTICS 2013, supra note 255, at 8; EXEC. OFFICE
FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTI-
CAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 9 (2005), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
usao/legacy/2006/12/07/05statrpt.pdf.
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FIGURE 1
FILINGS BY FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 2002–2012
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This trend of increased federal filings is not just representative of the last
ten years but is consistent with the past thirty years.  While there are occa-
sional declines, such as in 1992, 1994, 2006, and 2012,261 the theme is clear:
each year federal prosecutors file more charges than the year before.262  If
the filings trend is considered in tandem with prison population growth,
there is a strong inference that executive branch decisions (including deci-
sions of police to arrest and prosecutors to file charges) play a key role in the
rise of incarceration rates.  And there is evidence of increased incentives to
arrest and prosecute in recent years where there are grants or other pro-
grams designed to drive up numbers.263
2. State Trends
State prosecutorial trends are more difficult to track than their federal
counterparts, but demonstrate large increases in charging after close review.
The difficulty in tracking state prosecutions is due to the fact that most states
delegate prosecutorial responsibilities to individual counties and some coun-
261 See DOJ EXEC. OFFICE STATISTICS 2013, supra note 255, at 8; EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S.
ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ OFFICES:
FISCAL YEAR 1994, at 6 (1994), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/
2009/07/31/STATISTICAL_REPORT_FISCAL_YEAR_1994.pdf.
262 See supra notes 253–61 and accompanying text.
263 Rachel Godsil & L. Song Richardson, Racial Anxiety in Policing and Healthcare, 102
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 13) (on file with author).
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ties do a better job of tracking and reporting statistics than others.264
Despite this difficulty, John Pfaff observes that filing rates in state prosecu-
tors’ offices grew 37.4% from 1994 to 2008.265  Indeed, other research sup-
ports the conclusion that felony filing rates are increasing in state courts.  In
1993, the Court Statistics Project partnered with the National Association for
Court Management to create a network of courts (“the NACM Network”) to
gather data on state court caseloads.266  The NACM Network was comprised
of twenty-three state courts, located throughout twelve different states and
the District of Columbia.267  In the ten years following the establishment of
the NACM Network, seventeen of twenty-two reporting courts showed an
increase in the number of felony filings.268  The average growth among the
seventeen courts was 39%.269  Most notable among these courts were Mari-
copa County, Arizona, which had a growth of 131%,270 and Jackson County,
Missouri, which had an increase in felony cases filed per 1000 people of
77%.271
FIGURE 2
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PERSONS SENTENCED FOR A FELONY
IN STATE COURTS
264 See Pfaff, Micro and Macro Causes, supra note 22, at 1250 (identifying these difficul-
ties in working with state filing data).
265 Id. (observing this fact and noting that prison admissions during this same time also
increased at a rate of forty percent).
266 Cynthia G. Lee & Robert C. LaFountain, Felony Caseloads in the NACM Network, 12
CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2005), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collec-
tion/ctadmin/id/665.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
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Similarly, in Figure 2 above,272 reporting on 300 nationally representa-
tive counties we learn that between 1990 and 2006, the number of persons
sentenced for felonies increased dramatically.273  Overall, states show an
even more dramatic increase in charging rates than what we see in the fed-
eral system.
The reason for the growth in cases filed is likely similar to the trend in
federal cases.  Part I addressed the lack of checks for both state and federal
prosecutors as a broad explanation for this dramatic increase in cases filed.
272 Figure 2 was compiled using data generated from the National Judicial Reporting
Program (NJRP).  NJRP surveys have been conducted every two years since 1986.  The
surveys collect detailed information on the sentences and characteristics of convicted
felons.  Each survey is based on a sample of roughly 300 counties selected to be nationally
representative.  For example, the 1994 survey included at least one county from each state,
except Vermont. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL JUDICIAL
REPORTING PROGRAM, 1994: CODEBOOK 12–13 (1994) [hereinafter NJRP CODEBOOK 1994].
The 1996, 1998, and 2000 surveys were based on a sample of 344 counties and included at
least one county from each state except for Delaware, Montana, and Wyoming. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL JUDICIAL REPORTING PROGRAM, 2000:
CODEBOOK 1 (2000) [hereinafter NJRP CODEBOOK 2000]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL JUDICIAL REPORTING PROGRAM, 1998: CODEBOOK 1 (1998)
[hereinafter NJRP CODEBOOK 1998]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL JUDICIAL REPORTING PROGRAM, 1996: CODEBOOK i (1996) [hereinafter NJRP
CODEBOOK 1996].  The 2006 survey was based on the same 300 counties as the 2002 and
2004 surveys. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL JUDICIAL
REPORTING PROGRAM, 2006: CODEBOOK 5 (2006) [hereinafter NJRP CODEBOOK 2006].  The
total number of case-level data varied each year.  The lowest number of case-level data was
85,191 cases in 1994. See NJRP CODEBOOK 1994, supra, at 4.  The highest number of case-
level data was 494,055 cases in 2006. See NJRP CODEBOOK 2006, supra, at 5.  Most years saw
individual case-level data around 450,000. See NJRP CODEBOOK 2004, supra, at 4 (471,645
cases); NJRP CODEBOOK 2002, supra, at 1 (455,690 cases); NJRP CODEBOOK 2000, supra, at 1
(429,471 cases); NJRP CODEBOOK 1998, supra, at 1 (446,682 cases); NJRP CODEBOOK 1996,
supra, at i (414,969 cases).  The sources of data vary between survey years.  Depending on
the year, state courts were the source of NJRP data for about forty percent to eighty-five
percent of the counties sampled. E.g., SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006–STATISTICAL
TABLES 31 (2009) (indicating that in 2006 “[s]tate courts were the source of NJRP data for
about 44% of the counties sampled”).  For other counties, sources included prosecutors’
offices, sentencing commissions, departments of public safety, probation departments, and
correctional departments. Id.
273 JODI M. BROWN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1996, at 1 (1999); MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS,
2004, at 1 (2007); MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002, at 1 (2004); MAT-
THEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2000, at 1 (2003); MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET
AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 1998, at (2001); PATRICK A. LANGAN & JODI M. BROWN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1994, at 1 (1997);
ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 272, at 1.
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Several other questions still remain as far as why prosecutors are charging
more felonies and asking for longer sentences than they have historically
sought.  Have prosecutors become more aggressive, or more adversarial, in
the last thirty years?  What impact has the proliferation of criminal statutes
and increased sentences had on the willingness of defendants to go to trial?
Is it easier to convict individuals now?  Has law enforcement improved in
ferreting out crime and how much does this increase in arrests or convictions
result from the war on drugs?  These questions are not addressed in this Arti-
cle, but what is clear is that prosecutors and legislatures are contributing to
mass incarceration with increased felonies charged and increasing numbers
of harsh statutes.  Indeed, incentives exist for prosecutors not to decrease the
number of cases they bring but to increase them.  What is also clear is that
there is a Prosecutor Problem in criminal justice.
B. The Plea Problem
The structural checks in the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions are
intended for a criminal justice system that relies on trials.  Most of the indi-
vidual rights in these constitutions are trial rights.  The modern criminal jus-
tice system exclusively functions on pleas, and this is a change that has grown
steadily in the last forty to fifty years.274  Due to the lack of constitutional
changes as a result, there is a gap of rights.  Subconstitutional checks could
help fill that gap.  Before the discussion of those checks, it is important to
learn more about the plea system and how it affects executive power.  To do
so, we again rely on our example of the Prosecutor Problem and how the
plea system contributes to the imbalance of executive power due to missing
constitutional checks.
Prosecutorial power is at its peak when a prosecutor engages in plea
bargaining,275 and the plea bargaining system best illustrates the problems of
a lack of structural checks.  About ninety-five percent of criminal convictions
today are obtained through plea bargaining,276 so the criminal justice system
is basically a system of pleas, not of trials.  During the plea process, the prose-
cutor is able to set the parameters of the case by selecting the charges and
applicable sentencing guidelines to use as leverage.  Given the wide breadth
of modern criminal codes, the prosecutor essentially holds all of the cards.277
After all, if the defendant chooses not to settle, the sentencing guidelines
corresponding to the charges selected by the prosecutor will come into effect
274 See Bibas, supra note 29, at 912.
275 See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV.
1471, 1475–76 (1993) (discussing the power prosecutors have during plea bargaining,
which neither judge nor jury oversees).
276 Bibas, supra note 29, at 912.
277 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2464, 2475–76 (2004) (explaining that plea results diverge from likely trial outcomes
because they are hidden from public view and that plea bargaining is a secret area of law in
which there are no clear rules); id. at 2491 (“[T]he lumpiness of the Sentencing Guide-
lines and mandatory minima reinforces the pressure to cooperate . . . .”).
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post-trial.278  Such disproportionate bargaining positions, coupled with a lack
of oversight and consequences for an unsuccessful negotiation, lead many
prosecutors to overcharge because they have nothing to lose by doing so.279
And, if the case is weak, a plea bargain may boost the prosecutor’s win-to-loss
statistics without his ever having to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
For many years we have assumed that plea bargaining was an inevitable
part of the criminal justice system.  We assumed that since there were so
many cases filed each year, there would be no way for the system to be able to
handle the volume if most of these cases were not plead away.  However,
recent, thought-shifting work by Darryl Brown280 shows that we may be look-
ing at this backwards.  Maybe it is because prosecutors plead so many cases
that we have so many convictions.  If prosecutors were forced to hold trials or
had more strenuous requirements in plea bargaining, prosecutors would be
more likely to pick only the most important cases to prosecute and have less
of an impact on increases in convictions and prison rates.  This line of
research at least requires us to think whether it is making society safer or the
system any fairer to process so many people for crimes.
It is no secret that prosecutors handle daunting caseloads and are inter-
ested in disposing of many cases quickly.281  Legislatures’ tough-on-crime
policies and police departments’ zero-tolerance approaches, as well as
prosecutorial incentives to win all the cases they can win, ensure that prosecu-
tors’ caseloads remain large.282  Plea bargaining provides a tool to reduce
caseloads by disposing of cases without having to prepare for trial.  And
278 Id. at 2485 (noting that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines put a “huge premium”
on cooperating with the government because doing so can lead to an agreement below the
mandatory minimum, whereas failure to cooperate leaves the defendant to gamble with
“stiff sentences” and no parole).
279 Id. at 2475–76 (comparing the pressures of trial, which include pursuing every lead
and pressing every advantage in concern for one’s reputation as a prosecutor, with less
intense plea bargains).
280 Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV.
183, 195 (2014) (“The question is whether caseload increases are in fact exogenous to
adjudication.  With a better understanding of efficiency’s effects, we can see the possibility
that they are not.  Criminal prosecutions are a variable that may be partially dependent on
adjudicative capacity.  If so, efficiency gains in some part contribute to the rise in caseloads,
rather than the rise in caseloads creating a need for greater efficiency.  Rising caseloads
can be partly a consequence of more plea bargaining—a rebound effect—rather than a
cause.  Criminal charging may be a response to the reduced costs of court judgments as
much as it is a function of crime rates.  Do we plea bargain because we have more cases, or
do we have more cases because we plea bargain?”).
281 Bibas, supra note 10, at 961–62.
282 K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened
Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 290–91 (2014).  Professor Howell
describes “[z]ero-tolerance policing” as the approach of arresting individuals for minor
offenses rather than issuing warnings or summonses. Id. at 286 n.2.  This includes arrest-
ing individuals for minor, victimless offenses. Id. The zero-tolerance approach began in
New York in the mid-nineties and has spread to a number of jurisdictions. Id.
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reducing caseloads reduces workload and stress.283  Indeed, the prosecutor is
not immune to the desire for the path of least resistance.284  And individuals
who decide to go to trial are punished for it, as there is a “trial penalty” of
upwards of thirty percent if a defendant decides to exercise her right to trial
rather than choosing a plea bargain.285
What is more, prosecutors can use plea bargaining to incentivize defend-
ants to divulge information about or testify against other defendants.
Defendants often receive a lesser sentence when they provide valuable infor-
mation or testimony to prosecutors.  Defense attorneys are the only real
check on prosecutors in the current criminal justice system, and often they
have no power since they have repeat interactions and would not want to
disrupt the flow of pleas with a prosecutor.  Studies show that defendants’
sentences are in large part due to other cases before prosecutors (and the
group of cases negotiated), rather than the relative culpability of the defen-
dant.286  For example, one recent study of prosecutions of individuals
involved in mortgage fraud shows that often the worst offenders got the low-
est sentences in exchange for their testimony against several others.287  The
study examined one hundred completed cases and found that individuals
with deep involvement in the fraud often received lesser sentences due to
their ability and willingness to help prosecutors.288  Put simply, the most pro-
lific fraudsters had a greater incentive to cooperate with prosecutors in
exchange for lower sentences.  Of the one hundred cases, the study found
that at least thirty defendants received such reduced sentences (only three
months on average) or no time at all.289  Those who did not provide substan-
tial assistance to prosecutors received an average sentence of three years in
283 Bibas, supra note 29, at 913.
284 Id. at 922 (“The sooner each pending case goes away, the earlier the lawyer . . . can
go home to have dinner with friends and family.”).
285 Andrew Chongseh Kim, Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the
Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study, 84 MISS. L.J. 1195, 1252 tbl.3 (2015)
(finding a trial penalty of four times the usual penalty, as federal defendants convicted at
trial receive sentences sixty-four percent longer than if they had instead plead guilty).
286 See, e.g., Rich Lord, Mortgage Fraud Assault a Pyrrhic Victory, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (May 24, 2014), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/2014/05/25/Mortgage-
fraud-assault-a-Pyrrhic-victory/stories/201405250140.
287 Id. (summarizing findings from a study carried out by the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and
students from the Duquesne University School of Law).  Although the U.S. Attorney’s
Office in Pittsburgh used the worst offenders to gain information about lesser offenders,
not all prosecutors do so.  As Michael Simons, dean of St. John’s University School of Law,
put it,
The general principle is you want to make deals with the little fish to catch
the big fish.  You also in theory want to make deals with as few people as possible
to get the maximum result possible . . . . It’s not ideal to use a big fish to make a
case against a small fish. . . . But it nevertheless will happen.
Id. (second omission in original).
288 Id.
289 Id.  It is important to note that the rate of defendants granted lesser sentences for
substantial assistance—thirty of one hundred—is almost twice the national average. Id.
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prison.  Those who went to trial received an average sentence of six and a
half years.290  As the study shows, prosecutors often provide incentives for
defendants to cooperate in plea bargaining—and plead guilty—and provide
substantial assistance, regardless of culpability.  And due to the prosecutor’s
incentive to win as many cases as possible, rather than punish the most
deserving, prosecutors choose to convict a larger number of people over pun-
ishing those who may have been more culpable.  This quantity over quality
phenomenon is not unique to this study but happens in many instances of
charging.
Plea bargaining today is a dangerous display of executive power.  Prose-
cutors have almost unlimited power to charge whomever, with a plethora of
crimes, without any constitutional accountability.  Not only has this led to
increases in charging, but often individuals who are charged are not the most
deserving and, due to incentives, prosecutors choose quantity of convictions
over quality of convictions.  Structural checks and more internal review from
subconstitutional checks of the three branches could prevent this problem.
Specific subconstitutional checks are discussed in Part III.  Overall, though,
having all three branches of government independently and internally over-
seeing the Prosecutor Problem would bring the system back to its constitu-
tional roots.
The next Part explains how subconstitutional checks in criminal justice
may provide the right balance of power in criminal justice, reducing the Pros-
ecutor Problem as well as the other dysfunctions in criminal justice, includ-
ing mass incarceration and overcriminalization.
III. SUBCONSTITUTIONAL CHECKS IN CRIMINAL LAW
Subconstitutional checks may fill constitutional holes and solve criminal
justice dysfunction.  Part I explained, at a high level of abstraction, how the
three branches of government fail to provide the constitutional checks set
forth in the Constitution.  The executive branch largely fails to ensure adher-
ence to broad goals of the executive and provides conflicting orders; the leg-
islature demands little accountability and has increased executive power with
harsh statutes; and the judiciary often fails to hold prosecutors accountable
when abuses result and has largely been absent in ensuring individual consti-
tutional rights due to the dominance of plea bargaining.  Part II described
the constitutional dysfunctions that have resulted due to the lack of function-
ing structural constitutional checks and undeveloped subconstitutional
checks in criminal law.  One such example is the Prosecutor Problem, which
describes how one important type of executive actor has—without adequate
checks—single-handedly increased incarceration rates to epidemic propor-
tions at both the state and federal levels, and has reportedly been responsible
for abuses, including wrongful convictions, with impunity.
This Part, putting together the structural gaps explained in Part I and an
understanding of a case study of the Prosecutor Problem in Part II, begins to
290 Id.
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explore the types of subconstitutional checks that may address our current
state of constitutional dysfunction.  To be sure, this is not an exhaustive list of
subconstitutional checks, nor even the best list.  As described above, this is an
important ground for future work.291  What is provided below is a simple
start to exploring what subconstitutional checks in the three branches may
compensate for the lack of functioning structural checks in modern criminal
justice.  It is again grounded with examples of how subconstitutional checks
can address the Prosecutor Problem.
A. Executive Subconstitutional Checks
One key aspect to solving dysfunction is executive subconstitutional
checks.  This is also the largest hurdle presented of all subconstitutional
checks.  Obtaining agreement from any executive officers—including police
or prosecutors—to cede power and be subject to checks that will inevitably
slow their work will be difficult, to say the least.  But both officers and prose-
cutors are beholden to the executive or to the public—that can put pressure
on them after understanding the power imbalance that currently exists.
There is mounting public pressure against police and prosecutorial discre-
tion with high-profile police shootings and prosecutorial missteps.  The cli-
mate may be right to impose some checks on the executive branch,
particularly since the highest executive officers on both the federal level (the
president and attorney general) and in the state (the governor and state
attorney general) often have no direct review of data of arrest, charging, and
conviction trends and require little accountability of line prosecutors under
their discretion.  Direct review from within the highest levels of the executive
branch as well as transparency of large-scale criminal justice decisions by the
public would create the subconstitutional checks necessary in the executive
branch.
1. Executive Guidelines and Approval
One important subconstitutional check is the issuing of executive gui-
dance and approval requirements that do not exist on a national or consis-
tent state and local basis for federal and state executive criminal branches.
For instance, prosecutors, head state prosecutors (state and county levels),
and federal executive officers (namely the president and attorney general)
could provide broad internal guidelines advising offices of their goals for
their jurisdiction.  The executive officers could then require some level of
approval of decisions to bring charges according to these standards.  This
would help prevent the lack of an internal check on prosecutors who can
291 And it neglects to discuss the role of non-profit organizations or other government
watchdog groups and independent third-parties in providing a check to the government.
Certainly they have a major role in providing meaningful checks on the government or
even helping to form subconstitutional checks within the three branches.  Some examples
are the National Center for Non-Convictions, Institute for Justice, the Innocence Project,
and the Center for Prosecutor Integrity.
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make decisions based on their own intuition rather than coordinated deci-
sions in line with office policy objectives.  Approval should not be case-by-
case, but given periodically, and guidelines should be loosely based on a sta-
tistical analysis of what arrests, declinations, charges, and convictions were
brought in a particular year.  This executive guidance should not be released
to the public and there should not be negative consequences, if, for instance,
a prosecutor had a high number of declinations, as the overall goals should
be fair decisions or community safety rather than convictions.  In order to
mitigate mass incarceration, these central goals could clearly not articulate a
goal to win as many cases as possible or get as many felony counts or as much
prison time as possible.  As laughable as this sounds, the U.S. Attorneys’ Man-
ual instructions are not too far off from this in instructing prosecutors to
bring the cases they believe they can win rather than those that increase pub-
lic safety, while at the same time presidential and attorney general statements
massively contradict these goals with an aim to reduce U.S. mass
incarceration.
With careful executive guidance on all charging and conviction deci-
sions, hopefully prosecutors would be more careful in charging, as theoreti-
cally they would receive negative feedback for bringing a large number of
convictions against low-level individuals and fail to increase public safety in
the process.  Moreover, executive guidelines should challenge individual
offices to make internal charging changes to account for the contributions
they are each making to this broader problem.  Specific principles could be
set in place that would account for this problem.  For instance, one such
principle includes considering incarceration priorities, like reserving more
serious sentences for violent offenders than nonviolent offenders.  Another
could include reducing incarceration for drug crimes and increasing drug
treatment and alternatives to incarceration.  For white-collar crime, restitu-
tion can be placed as an office priority over prison time.  Offices should have
quarterly internal review procedures to determine whether individual prose-
cutors are meeting office goals.
Under the current system, obtaining convictions is how prosecutors are
advanced, and their internal incentives are to achieve more convictions for a
larger number of individuals.292  Many prosecutors tend to assume that
defendants are guilty,293 and according to Erwin Chemerinsky, operate in a
292 See Bowers, supra note 15, at 1711 (noting that conviction rates are the principal
measure of a prosecutor’s job performance and that every dismissal lowers that rate, but
every guilty plea raises it); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1589–90 (2006) (describing the
story of Earl Washington and noting that the injustice he suffered was due in part to a
prosecutorial culture that emphasizes winning); Litman, supra note 116, at 1152 (stating
that some prosecutors even go so far as to charge someone who holds useful information
just to intimidate the person into divulging that information regardless of the individual’s
independent blameworthiness).
293 Smith, supra note 234, at 384 (discussing how the culture causes many prosecutors
to develop cynicism, be suspicious, untrusting, and disbelieving rather than be labeled a
“sucker,” which leads prosecutors to develop the presumption that everyone is guilty).
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pro-police culture that discourages asking questions about misconduct.294
When prosecutors win and obtain convictions they receive praise and
favorable career outcomes.295  Guilty pleas or verdicts help advance a prose-
cutor’s career.  If convictions are tantamount to success, prosecutors natu-
rally feel pressure to obtain more.  These incentives likely cause more plea
bargains, aimed at convictions, not at determining the correct punishment
for the crime that will render the most public good.296
Guidance and instruction from the executive branch would change
incentives for prosecutors.  Recent scholarship supports the intuitive premise
that prosecutors—like other rational employees—make decisions based on
what they believe will help them advance in their career.297  For example,
one factor as to whether or not a prosecutor is promoted in the Los Angeles
District Attorney’s Office depends on conviction rates, which encourages
more convictions.298  Indeed, in some state prosecutors’ offices, winning a
conviction is such a close proxy to quality of work that a prosecutor has to file
a report explaining an acquittal but never a conviction.299  This has impacts
294 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse: The Lessons of
Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 315–16 (2001); see Burke, supra note 292, at 1603
(“The phenomenon of confirmation bias suggests a natural tendency to review the reports
not for exculpatory evidence . . . but instead for inculpatory, confirming evidence.”);
Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
512, 517–18 (2007) (discussing the “tunnel vision” that prosecutors suffer when they hone
their sights on one suspect (quoting Findley & Scott, supra note 241, at 292)); Myrna
Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do with It?: A Commentary on Wrongful Convictions and
Rationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1315, 1327. But cf. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTAND-
ING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 219 (1990) (arguing that ethical prosecutors are able to review objec-
tively the evidence and start the criminal process only when they are satisfied that the
suspect is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt).
295 See Bibas, supra note 277, at 2471–72 (“Favorable win-loss statistics boost prosecu-
tors’ egos, their esteem, their praise by colleagues, and their prospects for promotion and
career advancement.”).
296 Bibas, supra note 29, at 921–22.
297 See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 129
(2008) (arguing that a change to the inner workings of prosecutors’ offices can improve
prosecutorial transparency); see also Bibas, supra note 29, at 935 (contending that because
district attorneys are elected “they face electoral pressure to maximize convictions [and]
push their unelected subordinates to increase conviction rates”); Daniel S. Medwed, The
Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125,
182 (2004) (“[T]he institutional culture of most prosecutors’ offices treasures convictions,
and an attorney’s conviction rate may serve as a barometer of that person’s stature within
the organization and a key factor in determining that person’s chances for internal
advancement.”); O’Brien, supra note 242, at 1010 (stating that “[h]igh conviction rates
bolster re-election campaigns” and “help an individual prosecutor advance within the
office”); Smith, supra note 234, at 390 (“The same pressure [to win] is present in ordinary,
run-of-the-mill cases.  The pressure is both external, the result of the inherently political
nature of prosecution, and internal, the result of policies relating to salary and promo-
tion.” (footnote omitted)).
298 O’Brien, supra note 242, at 1010 n.40 (citing Chemerinsky, supra note 294, at 321).
299 Id. at 1010 (citing Medwed, supra note 297, at 137, 153).
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on charging and plea bargaining practices among prosecutors.  If the execu-
tive leaders instructed a prosecutors’ office to define success apart from just
“winning” a case by obtaining a conviction and rewarded them based on that
metric, a prosecutor would have different incentives.  Thus, the desire to suc-
ceed alone does not cause prosecutorial misconduct—when success is synon-
ymous with “seeking justice,” or promoting public safety, it is less likely to
incentivize misconduct.  When success is synonymous with convictions, how-
ever, it is more likely to lead to misconduct.  If success includes cutting costs,
however, prosecutors may be praised for seeking more community service
sentences, more restitution and fines, and less incarceration for less serious
crimes.  For instance, just in the drug context, federal defendants serve an
average of three years for drug possession and six years for drug traffick-
ing,300 despite efforts by executive leaders to reduce the focus on drug con-
victions.  If executive leaders provided instruction that offices were
accountable to comply with these reductions, prosecutors would be forced to
change charging practices.  This would likely lead to more consistency in
charging within and between offices throughout the country, and ultimately
reductions in incarceration.
Two potential concerns with executive review are efficiency and costs.
The first concern about a decrease in efficiency, though, may actually pro-
vide a benefit.  While a dramatic shift in prosecutor goals of obtaining as
many convictions as possible is a lofty goal at this point, at the very least, this
executive check would slow down the prosecutorial charging process, which
would likely reduce the number of convictions and force prosecutors to pri-
oritize which cases they want to bring.  This is how prosecutors used to func-
tion in the 1960s and 1970s when they still brought most cases to trial, and
when convictions were slower and judges and jurors acted as checks.301
Adding a layer of review to today’s plea system could artificially recreate the
slower and more deliberate prosecutor of the 1970s.  As far as the concern
for costs, internal executive reviews do not have to cost more.  For instance,
prosecutors can be reassigned or take rotating shifts reviewing cases for the
office or other offices to determine whether the decisions that were made
were in line with policy directives.  This may also have the added side benefit
of bringing fewer cases as a whole, potentially because some prosecutors
would be focused on internal checks of charging rather than bringing new
charges.  Blind review should be practiced, whenever possible.302
300 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.13
(2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-re
ports-and-sourcebooks/2012/Table13.pdf; Drugs and Crime Facts, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/ptrpa.cfm (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
301 See Andrew M. Siegel, When Prosecutors Control Criminal Court Dockets: Dispatches on
History and Policy from a Land Time Forgot, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 337, 375 (2005).
302 Sunita Sah, Christopher T. Robertson & Shima B. Baughman, Blinding Prosecutors to
Defendants’ Race: A Policy Proposal to Reduce Unconscious Bias in the Criminal Justice System, 1
BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 69 (2015).
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2. Executive Review and Data Collection
An executive review (annual or biannual) of prosecutorial decisions
based on data regarding charging and declinations would help provide a sub-
constitutional check in criminal justice.  While transparency in the reasoning
of an individual prosecutorial or judicial decision for the public may be prob-
lematic, as sometimes the nuances of criminal defendants’ rights or victims’
situations can be misunderstood, transparency in prosecutorial decisionmak-
ing in bulk (where prosecutors’ charging decisions are reviewed as a whole
over a six- or twelve-month period rather than individually) is not problem-
atic and may satisfy the tension between the public’s wanting more informa-
tion and prosecutors’ desires to maintain discretion for difficult individual
decisions.
Bulk data on charging and convictions of prosecutors would help execu-
tive leaders and the public scrutinize prosecutor decisions.  As a police paral-
lel, many people knew anecdotally that New York police were
disproportionately focused on minority communities and stopped African
Americans more often than whites.303  However, it was only when New York
Police Department (NYPD) data was released and confirmed that New York
police were stopping a disproportionate number of African Americans with
their stop-and-frisk policy and that only 0.1% of these individuals possessed
illegal drugs or weapons, that things changed.304  Making available this
broad, high-level data on police stops changed the policy of the New York
police.  Public data of broad trends in state and federal prosecution, charg-
ing, conviction, and other data could have a similar effect with prosecution.
Even internal reviews within offices could provide some helpful checks.
Marc Miller and Ronald Wright contend that when prosecutors build data
systems and have to state reasons for the record and monitor trends in discre-
tionary choices, even regulation from within the office can be effective.305
While some jurisdictions provide public reports, they do not come with high-
level executive review, public oversight, or independent review.  New York
recently attempted to legislate an independent review board to review
prosecutorial decisions.306  In other fields, this is a standard procedure.  For
303 Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Landmark Decision: Judge Rules NYPD
Stop and Frisk Practices Unconstitutional, Racially Discriminatory (Aug. 12, 2014), https:/
/ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/landmark-decision-judge-rules-nypd-
stop-and-frisk-practices.
304 Id. (“In 2011, the NYPD reported a record 685,724 stops—a 600 percent increase
since Raymond Kelly took over as NYPD Commissioner in 2002.  Eighty-four percent of
those stopped were Black or Latino, and 88 percent of the people stopped were neither
arrested nor received summonses.  Despite the stated purpose of the policy, weapons and
contraband were recovered less than 2 percent of the time.”); see also Floyd v. City of New
York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing African-American and Latino
residents filing § 1983 actions alleging that the City’s police department’s stop-and-frisk
policy violated their constitutional rights).
305 See Miller & Wright, supra note 297, at 133, 159, 162–65.
306 S.B. 24-B, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1–2 (N.Y. 2015) (“A state commission of
prosecutorial conduct is hereby established.  The commission shall have the authority to
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instance, some hospitals perform monthly “mortality and morbidity” reviews
where they discuss bad outcomes with patients and try to learn from the deci-
sions that were made.307  Members of the public are not permitted into these
review meetings and are not allowed for the purpose of litigation.308  Indeed,
internal periodic review without public oversight can be useful to help
change systems and help individuals learn from mistakes.  Although
medicine is different from law, an individual’s health is as important as her
liberty.  When removing the liberty of many individuals as a wholesale matter,
it is important to review these decisions to ensure that justice prevails.
Internal executive reviews are already starting to take place in the legal
field, though not in a uniform or formal manner.  For instance, in Los Ange-
les, teams of prosecutors practicing within the office but not assigned to the
case are assigned to review files.309  Also, several years ago, the Santa Clara
County District Attorney invited outside advocates to look at the racial dispar-
ities in convictions within the office to provide feedback.310  And Brooklyn
has wrongful-conviction units to review the work of its prosecution teams.  In
the federal system, the DOJ has internal and blind review by lawyers not
involved in the particular capital cases at issue.311  Indeed, internal review
can serve as an important subconstitutional check.
review the conduct of prosecutors . . . to determine whether [prosecutors’] conduct . . .
departs from the applicable statutes, case law, New York Rules of Professional Conduct . . .
including but not limited to Rule 3.8 (Special Responsibilities of Prosecutors and Other
Government Lawyers)” (citation omitted)); see also Gershman, supra note 138 (asserting a
need for an independent review board “to investigate and discipline prosecutors for mis-
conduct” because under the current situation prosecutors have unlimited discretion and
“are essentially exempt from any outside supervision, oversight, or accountability”).
307 See generally Juliet Higginson et al., Mortality and Morbidity Meetings: An Untapped
Resource for Improving the Governance of Patient Safety?, 21 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 576 (2012);
Betty Tuong et al., The Experience of Conducting Mortality and Morbidity Reviews in a Pediatric
Interventional Radiology Service: A Retrospective Study, 20 J. VASCULAR & INTERVENTIONAL RADI-
OLOGY 77 (2009).
308 See Tuong et al., supra note 307, at 577 (“Historically, [mortality and morbidity]
meetings have been led and attended only by the medical profession and have remained
autonomous, with knowledge not being available or shared with other professions or across
the wider hospital governance framework.”).
309 Jackie Lacey, Opinion, Why A Conviction Review Unit Is Needed, INSIDE LADA (June
29, 2015), http://da.co.la.ca.us/about/inside-LADA/opinion-why-conviction-review-unit-
needed (briefing the media, announcing that “the Board of Supervisors approved funding
for a Conviction Review Unit comprised of three experienced deputy district attorneys,
one senior investigator and one paralegal” and that “[p]rosecutors assigned to the new
unit will be selected by the management team to handle this important responsibility”).
310 Press Release, Cty. of Santa Clara, County of Santa Clara Juvenile Justice Team Rec-
ognized for Services to Minority Communities (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.sccgov.org/
sites/opa/nr/Pages/County-of-Santa-Clara-Juvenile-Justice-Team-Recognized-for-Services-
to-Minority-Communities-.aspx (noting that the juvenile justice system is “tackling the issue
of overrepresentation of youth of color in the juvenile justice system”).
311 See Sah, Robertson & Baughman, supra note 302 (proposing a policy change where
identification of race should be omitted from criminal proceedings wherever possible).
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It is critical to point out here that internal reporting is not the panacea
of subconstitutional checks and must be performed with careful considera-
tion of incentives and must consider the right data.  Depending on what data
is collected, individual incentives can change as well as behavior.  Pam Metz-
ger and Andrew Ferguson discuss in a recent article how data collection goals
actually impact attorney action.312  Employees respond to what is measured.
Improper reporting or focusing on the wrong data can actually increase
prosecutorial charging.  Often DOJ members have to report their declina-
tions (or decisions not to prosecute) internally,313 and depending on the
heads of office there can be pressure to bring more cases so that declination
percentages are not too high.  Indeed this current DOJ policy has, by some
confidential reports of staff, actually encouraged attorneys to increase charg-
ing in order to “keep numbers up” from year to year to justify employ-
ment.314  However, incentives can be used to encourage positive results.  For
instance, if prosecutors’ offices had to try a certain number of cases, the num-
ber of pleas could be reduced.  If prosecutors’ offices had to pay the cost of
prison, this would discourage a reflexive sentence including jail time.  If pros-
ecutors’ offices were financially rewarded by reducing recidivism rather than
crime rates, there may be a greater emphasis on treatment.  Measuring those
outcomes might alter behavior along the continuum.  Overall, it is important
to carefully consider the types of data that should be gathered and relied on
in determining the performance of executive officers.
Another internal executive subconstitutional check is an internal
whistleblower mechanism for prosecutors.  One of the reasons prosecutors
may not listen to higher executive instructions (for instance the attorney gen-
eral or governor) is that they are beholden to their immediate supervising
attorneys and subject to their reviews for advancement.  Some prosecutors
feel pressure from leadership to bring unjustified cases, overcharge cases, or
make unfair plea deals due to pressure or advice from superior prosecutors.
Worse yet, some prosecutors are pressured not to reveal exculpatory informa-
tion or break constitutional laws.  There is no current internal mechanism
within state and local government to provide prosecutors an avenue to safely
report this information.  An internal mechanism, like a confidential
whistleblower mechanism in state and federal offices where an attorney who
feels pressure to bring charges when they are not justified or against state or
federal policy can report these instances, would serve as an important sub-
312 Pamela Metzger & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL. L. REV.
1057, 1057 (2015) (“Building off of the successful implementation of system-based
approaches in other complex, high-risk industries such as aviation and medicine, Defending
Data explains how defenders can develop a data-driven systems approach to public
defense.”).
313 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 81, § 9-2.020 (“Whenever a case is closed with-
out prosecution, the United States Attorney’s files should reflect the action taken and the
reason for it.”); O’Neill, supra note 115, at 1458 (“Presently, the DOJ requires AUSAs to
indicate why they have chosen to forgo a prosecution.”).
314 This information comes from confidential interviews with Department of Justice
attorneys.
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constitutional check.315  This could decrease the risk of pressure by supervis-
ing attorneys and may increase a law-abiding culture or one where executive
demands are followed more closely.  Another important result of such a
mechanism is that there would be more adherence to executive guidelines
and less incentive to make bad political decisions as an office.
Collection of broad data and videotaping of investigations and plea bar-
gaining negotiations for internal review (of individual interrogations and
pleas) and public review of overall data on these crucial pieces of investiga-
tion are also critical subconstitutional checks on the executive branch.  These
individual case records should not be released to the public but held inter-
nally for review of the actions of prosecutors—by higher executive officials or
independent bodies—to make sure the law is followed.  Data on charging
decisions, declinations, and other relevant case information should be col-
lected on a state and federal basis and reasons for charging, pleas, and decli-
nations should be discussed internally and independently.  Attorneys should
have to make a case for plea bargaining internally rather than simply being
able to resolve plea cases without any oversight.
Data on plea bargains and interrogations could be examined and
reviewed.  For instance, if an office demonstrated that Bob Prosecutor in a
certain year routinely offered pleas that were twice as harsh as the average
prosecutor in that county or in that state, it might impact his status at the
office.  This would not require a set of guidelines indicating what to charge
in each individual case, which would remove too much discretion, but it
would at least provide broad information on whether prosecutors in a certain
office were out of step or what impact individual decisions have on overall
incarceration or public safety figures.316  Videotaping investigations and plea
negotiations, like body cameras with police, would serve as an important
315 This could operate like a government-side Sarbanes-Oxley or confidential human
resources reporting of sexual harassment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
316 More use of existing data, like the DMC (Disproportionate Minority Contact) data
and court budget reports that indicate the outcome of cases and how many cases are
charged by prosecutors, would also be helpful. See Disproportionate Minority Contact, OFF. OF
JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://www.ojjdp.gov/dmc/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2016).
A formal requirement to analyze this data on the state and federal level to determine
where prosecutors are focusing and whether these decisions are the correct ones given
policy objectives of the state or federal executive would create more of a subconstitutional
check.  Bibas, supra note 10, at 960 (“[P]ublishing more data on charges, convictions, plea
bargains, and sentences could also improve accountability.” (emphasis omitted)); Brandi
L. Byrd et al., Investigating the Justice System Response to Domestic Violence in Missouri, 63 J. MO.
B. 222, 226 (2007) (illustrating through data analysis that uses an “interdisciplinary investi-
gative approach” that there is “considerable variability among Missouri counties regarding
the judicial, prosecutorial, and law enforcement responses to domestic violence” and that
“[t]he results of this study have provided a new way to quantify the justice system’s respon-
siveness to a common crime”); Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and the Federal-
ization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145
U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1314 (1997) (arguing that “the traditional justifications for granting
federal prosecutors almost unchecked discretion in making their charging decisions fail to
outweigh the important constitutional rights at issue”).
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executive check on prosecutorial misconduct.  Due to recent pressure, state
and federal government leaders have shown some initiative with funding to
purchase 50,000 police body cameras in two years.317
Another could be to consider the number of felonies charged and incar-
ceration dollars spent per office and whether the defendant was a risk for
violent crime or recidivism.318  An example of a goal could be to consider the
crime clearance cases of a particular office compared to the arrests.  For
instance, in 2014, according to FBI numbers tracking national arrests, there
were 498,666 arrests for violent crimes and eleven million total arrests.319
Drug arrests were the largest single category of arrests nationally.320  In 2014,
crime clearance rates for murder were around sixty percent nationwide—
leaving forty percent of murders unsolved.321  Similarly, crime clearance
rates for arson and motor vehicle theft were both below twenty percent.322
An explanation for these numbers requires further research but these num-
bers certainly seem to indicate that drug arrests are the overwhelming focus
of police when many violent crimes and property crimes remain unsolved.  It
is possible that refocusing efforts on solving violent or property crimes rather
than arresting individuals for drug crimes may reduce the number of convic-
tions but could lead to increased safety in the community, particularly given
the low number of violent crimes committed by drug defendants.323  Indeed,
tracking of numbers indicating an increase in safety of the community,
rather than arrests or convictions, may help the executive achieve its goal of
making the public safer.
317 See, e.g., Terry Carter, $19.3M in Grants Will Go Toward Body Cameras for Police, DOJ
Announces, ABA J. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/19.3m_in_
grants_will_go_towards_body_cameras_for_police_doj_announces/?utm_source=maestro
&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=tech_monthly (setting up $19.3 million in grants
to various police departments across the country for bodycams).
318 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2014: VIOLENT CRIME 1 (2014), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-
the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/violent-crime
(“In 2014, an estimated 1,165,383 violent crimes occurred nationwide, a decrease of 0.2
percent from the 2013 estimate.”).
319 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2014 tbl.29 (2014), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-29 (noting that the exact estimated numbers are
11,205,833 total crimes and 498,666 violent crimes).
320 Id. (noting that there were an estimated 1,561,231 drug abuse violations and that
the next largest category was theft at 1,238,190).
321 Id. at tbl.25, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-
in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-25 (noting that 64.5% of murders and nonnegligent man-
slaughters were cleared by arrest or exceptional means, and that only 47.4% of violent
crimes were cleared by arrest or exceptional means).
322 Id. (noting that 12.8% of motor vehicle theft and 21.7% of arson was cleared by
arrest or exceptional means).
323 See Baradaran, supra note 93, at 234 (“The link between drugs and violence that
underlies much of U.S. drug policy lacks sufficient empirical support, but yet pervades
modern day legislative statutes and judicial decisions.”).
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Providing executive branch leaders (head prosecutors, attorneys gen-
eral, and others) with data about the charging and sentencing practices of
their offices may help them recognize where bias or other abuses occur in
the system.  Some prosecutors’ offices have used this information to imple-
ment policies to reduce unjustified racial discrepancies in charging, for
instance.  Angela Davis recommends collecting and publishing data on the
race of the defendant and victim in each case and the prosecutorial action at
each stage in the process,324 in order to find and reduce racial disparities
and hold elected prosecutors accountable.325  For instance, the Prosecution
and Racial Justice Program of the Vera Institute of Justice has successfully
implemented a modified version of Davis’s system in multiple prosecutors’
offices across the country.326  Vera developed a system that analyzed
prosecutorial discretion in a number of areas in the prosecutorial process.327
This system became a useful tool in identifying areas where the offices were
unknowingly exhibiting racial bias.  When Vera began working in the Meck-
lenburg County District Attorney’s Office in North Carolina, it discovered
two alarming statistics.328  First, the office was prosecuting about ninety-seven
percent of all drug cases, while it was only prosecuting seventy percent of all
cases combined.329  Further, of these drug cases, African-American women
were prosecuted more vigorously than any other group—one hundred per-
cent of the time.330  These findings encouraged the District Attorney to make
changes in his office that led to significant decreases in these imbalances.331
However a major weakness of these programs acknowledged by Davis332 is
that the program is at the complete discretion of the prosecutor.  It requires
full access to the offices, granted by the chief prosecutors.333  Continued
access is also at the will of these prosecutors, and one program was termi-
nated when a new district attorney declined to carry it on.334  Further, the
chief prosecutor is not obligated to act on any finding of racial discrepancy,
324 Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 13, 54 (1998).
325 Angela J. Davis, In Search of Racial Justice: The Role of the Prosecutor, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 821, 836 (2013).
326 Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, VERA INST. OF JUST., http://www.vera.org/cen-
ters/prosecution-and-racial-justice-program (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
327 WAYNE MCKENZIE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE:
USING DATA TO ADVANCE FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 1 (2009) http://www.vera
.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Using-data-to-advance-fairness-in-criminal-
prosecution.pdf.
328 See id. at 7.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id. Additionally, in Milwaukee, Vera Institute realized that black defendants were
charged in prostitution cases nine percent more than white defendants.  Davis, supra note
325, at 841 & n.106.  This prompted the district attorney to seek training for staff to
increase cultural competency in dealing with prostitution cases. Id. at 843–44.
332 See Davis, supra note 325, at 846–48.
333 Id. at 837.
334 Id. at 839.
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no matter how blatant.  While increased information to the public about
prosecutors’ internal charging and plea decisions would increase accounta-
bility, the Supreme Court has protected this lack of transparency.335  Thus,
without judicial review or legislative requirements that provide necessary
checks, the executive branch will not be able to check itself by just collecting
data alone.  And there must be internal accountability within the executive
branch once abuses or deviation from executive policy is detected, and broad
public availability of data of executive decisions.
B. Judicial Checks
Our constitutional structure envisions criminal trials with juries, grand
juries, and judges to provide judicial review of constitutional rights to prevent
the unfair punishment of U.S. citizens.  The federal judiciary has largely abdi-
cated its duties to the executive branch and deferred in allowing the execu-
tive to administer the law without any real checks.  Many state courts have
similarly adopted a deferential attitude when it comes to executive decision-
making in criminal justice.  The judiciary should adopt subconstitutional
checks including judicial review of plea agreements and oversight of criminal
discovery and prosecutorial and police misconduct, in addition to treating
more carefully its constitutional duty to provide review of individual constitu-
tional rights.
1. Strict Judicial Review of Pleas and Misconduct
On the judicial front, proper review of plea agreements would help bal-
ance the power between the branches.  Judges should take a much more
active role in reviewing plea agreements and raise the level of difficulty for
prosecutors to charge so many cases so quickly without consideration of the
consequences.336  Plea agreements are simple to administer and require very
little input from judges.  This is a system that has developed over time since
the late 1960s and changed the nature of the criminal rights demanded by
the Constitution.  To effectuate those rights, judges should closely review
plea agreements and other executive decisions.
Since plea bargaining is essentially the way criminal cases are dealt with
and there are so few trials, a plea may be treated like an administrative adju-
dication.  For instance, judges could be involved as a third party in plea deci-
335 See DAVIS, supra note 223, at 8; Abby L. Dennis, Note, Reining in the Minister of Justice:
Prosecutorial Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 135–36 (2007); Lupton,
supra note 166, at 1287.
336 See Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1225 (2016) (giving an originalist analysis that provides that separation of powers does not
stop the judiciary from reviewing plea agreements and other prosecutorial decisions); Ste-
phen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1997 (1992) (“[J]udicial
review of plea agreements is more important and more productive than judicial review of
initial charging decisions . . . [and] judicial power to reject lenient plea agreements can
serve a useful function and should, if anything, be invoked more frequently.”).
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sions.  Like in the administrative context, judges can serve as the neutral
third party while the prosecutor argues his best case for the harshest sentence
and the defendant’s counsel argues their best case for their client.  The third-
party magistrate judge could make the decision that would be subject to judi-
cial review.  Because the U.S. criminal justice system is adversarial and not
inquisitorial, it requires accountability from all sides regarding legal obliga-
tions.337  Without checks on prosecutors, it is unreasonable to expect prose-
cutors to turn over evidence to the other side, especially when more than
ninety percent of the time judges do not hold them accountable when they
do not turn it over.338  Judicial involvement may provide the necessary
checks in an adversarial system by requiring the executive to be accountable
to a neutral third party in its decisions.
A core judicial function is interpreting statutes.339  This is not happen-
ing in the criminal context and is necessary as a subconstitutional check.
Judges should read statutes and provide a neutral voice in plea negotia-
tions.340  The Supreme Court recently expressed its frustration at the lack of
judicial involvement in interpreting criminal statutes in plea negotiations.341
As such, judges should take on this role of interpreting criminal statutes
before approving plea agreements.
337 See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 750–51 (2003) (noting that there is a “growing recognition that the
road to criminal justice reform lies not through the battleground of defendant rights—
where trench warfare has replaced the swift advances of the Warren years and even the
advances have generally proved to be just chits to be traded for lower sentences—but
through attention to what Jerry Lynch has called the ‘indigenous administrative-inquisito-
rial structures that in fact process most American criminal cases’” (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2151 (1998))); David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634,
1635 (2009) (“A broad and enduring theme of American jurisprudence treats the Conti-
nental, inquisitorial system of criminal procedure as epitomizing what our system is not;
avoiding inquisitorialism has long been thought a core commitment of our legal
heritage.”).
338 See Baer, supra note 45, at 15 (“Much of the literature critiquing Brady presents an
unspoken paradox.  On the one hand, the doctrine requires too little of prosecutors, forc-
ing them only to turn over ‘material’ evidence in time for trial.  At the same time, stories
abound of prosecutors who have either intentionally or negligently withheld material
exculpatory evidence, often to the great detriment of defendants who have been wrong-
fully accused and convicted of serious crimes.”); Bibas, supra note 10, at 977 (noting that
sanctions are rare for prosecutors and “usually amount to a censure or other slap on the
wrist,” and describing surveys conducted where “[m]any . . . involved present[ ] false evi-
dence, withhold[ ] exculpatory evidence, or l[ie] to or deceiv[e] the court”).
339 See Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
537 (2012) (arguing that federal courts should change how they interpret criminal statutes
to help overcome overcriminalization).
340 See id. at 590–91 (arguing that by narrowly interpreting statutes courts can help
overcome overcriminalization).
341 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551
(2015) (No. 13-7120); Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
1074 (2015) (No. 13-7451).
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Involving judges in the plea bargaining system would certainly be less
efficient.  Prosecutors would have to prove cases more thoroughly and judges
interpret statutes fairly.  However, considering how quickly we convict indi-
viduals, maybe a less efficient system where prosecutors have to prove cases
more thoroughly and take more cases to trial would be a good thing.  For
instance, under the military system, pleas are more expensive and difficult to
prove than a trial.342  In order to bring a case, prosecutors have to sell their
case to a higher officer.  Also, judges are required to make extensive findings
and the comparative cost of a trial is much less.  As a result, it is much more
likely that a prosecutor brings a case to trial rather than a plea bargain.  We
could change our structure to make it more difficult for prosecutors to plea
than go to trial if judges were involved.343  Similarly, the civil law system has a
completely different balance of power between the judge, prosecutor, and
defense, and should be considered here.
The judiciary could act as a real check on the executive branch if it pro-
vided in-depth review of plea decisions and interpreted criminal statutes in
plea negotiations.  This way, the judicial branch could still enforce the indi-
vidual constitutional rights demanded for criminal defendants in the Consti-
tution.  This subconstitutional check would fill the current gap caused by a
lack of criminal trials and the lack of judicial involvement in plea
agreements.
342 See Stuntz, supra note 36, at 2035 (“Military courts . . . review the factual basis of
guilty pleas with great care, and with little deference to the pleas themselves.”); see also
CHARLES D. SWIFT & PATRICK K. KORODY, COURT-MARTIAL ADVOCACY: TRYING THE MILITARY
CASE § 1:42, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2016) (“The bases for a military accused’s
right to a speedy trial are found in several sources including the Sixth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (§ 810), and the Rules
for Courts-Martial (707).  Additionally, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
also assures military accused the right to a speedy trial.”); Edward F. Sherman, A Special
Kind of Justice, 84 YALE L.J. 373, 375 (1974) (reviewing JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., JUSTICE
UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW (1974)); Alex Hemmer, Note, Civil Servant Suits, 124
YALE L.J. 758, 785–86 (2014) (“As a matter of law, civil servants have been protected for
decades—first under the common law, and today by state and federal whistleblower stat-
utes—from being disciplined for disobeying unlawful commands.  As a matter of practice,
however, it seems clear that the right is rarely exercised, and rarer still . . . where disputes
between the government and civil servants turn on the legality of high-profile programs.
There is a right to resist, in other words, but we lack a thorough understanding of what it
entails.”); Note, Liability for Torts of Military Personnel, 55 HARV. L. REV. 651, 653 (1942)
(“The rule that is most widely accepted today is a more lenient one: the subordinate is
liable for executing an unlawful command only when he believed it was illegal, or when it
was so palpably illegal that a reasonable man would have realized its invalidity.”); Note,
Military Justice and Article III, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 1921 (1990) (“Although the military
justice system recognizes the problem of unlawful command influence, the rigid structure
of military authority makes avoidance of such problems very difficult.” (footnote omitted)).
343 Another cost measure could be that prosecutors could be assigned a budget alloca-
tion and they would have to make decisions about how much prison time to recommend
for individuals they charge, and they could run out of space in county jails and state pris-
ons if they overspent their allotment.
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2. Judicial Enforcement of Individual Rights
The judiciary has abandoned its role of enforcing individual constitu-
tional rights for criminal defendants.  There are several roles that a judge
could play in criminal cases that would help provide a subconstitutional
check.  Overall, judges could oversee criminal discovery similar to the way
magistrates oversee civil discovery with timelines, deadlines, and decisions
that hold each side accountable.  Without accountability by a third party, it is
no wonder that prosecutors often fail to turn over Brady material, or inter-
pret Brady obligations in their favor.  With a judge ruling on all of these indi-
vidual decisions, this would provide the needed check to ensure that
prosecutors actually hand over exculpatory information.  Judges could over-
see this turning over of Brady information and even set a time for it to be
turned over.  Judges could set time for discovery and also require checks for
effective assistance of counsel.  Judges could ensure that the defendant has
had adequate time with counsel and understands his rights at every stage of
the process.
One subconstitutional check is opening the door to § 1983 actions344
against executive officers in the criminal context.  Certainly, § 1983 prohibits
civil suits,345 but possibly allowing an exception when a person has been
unfairly prosecuted or investigated or mistreated by an executive officer in
relation to a criminal case, may be justified.  This may provide a subconstitu-
tional check on police and prosecutors by offering a larger incentive to treat
defendants fairly.  This would help protect criminal defendants in the same
way civil litigants are with rights to sue government officials for misconduct.
Certainly judges have not stood back and been completely uninvolved in
the criminal dysfunction, particularly when it comes to perceived legislative
missteps.  Judges have famously testified before Congress to reduce drug
sentences in federal cases.346  Judges have written opinions complaining
344 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (enabling individuals to file a civil action for deprivations
of constitutional and federal statutory rights by persons acting under the color of law).
345 Id.
346 See Sasha Abramsky, Jed Rakoff and the Lonely Fight for Wall Street Justice: The Federal
Judge Is Waging a One-Man War on Bank-Friendly SEC Settlements, NATION (June 18, 2014),
https://www.thenation.com/article/jed-rakoff-and-lonely-fight-wall-street-justice/. In
addition to “demanding that large financial institutions be held fully accountable,” Judge
Rakoff has held the federal death penalty unconstitutional and has pushed for the public
release of documents. Id.; see Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-
people-plead-guilty/ (sharply criticizing the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines); Seth Schiesel &
Simon Romero, WorldCom Strikes a Deal with S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2002), http://www
.nytimes.com/2002/11/27/business/worldcom-strikes-a-deal-with-sec.html (describing
Judge Rakoff’s role in instituting corporate governance reform at WorldCom); Matt
Taibbi, Finally, a Judge Stands Up to Wall Street, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www
.rollingstone.com/politics/news/finally-a-judge-stands-up-to-wall-street-20111110#ixzz1iH
rUuQzQ (“Federal judge Jed Rakoff, a former prosecutor with the U.S. Attorney’s
office . . . in New York, is fast becoming a sort of legal hero of our time.”); Ian Thoms,
Rakoff Slams US Sentencing Guidelines for Being Too Harsh, LAW360 (May 14, 2012), http://
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about mandatory minimums as well, in an effort to take a stand against exec-
utive power.347  However, these are not subconstitutional checks.  They do
not grant power to judges to actually stop legislative or executive acts that are
unjust.  In order for the judiciary to provide a meaningful check, it must
actively take on its constitutional duty to check the executive by better enforc-
ing constitutional rights, providing active review of plea negotiations and
criminal discovery, and possibly interpreting § 1983 to apply to criminal gov-
ernment officers.
C. Legislative Checks
The legislature has often served as an assistant to the executive branch in
criminal cases, rather than as a check.  Legislatures have passed harsh legisla-
tion, failed to review executive decisions, and neglected to study the impact
of their legislation on criminal justice as enforced by the executive.  Subcon-
stitutional checks should be put in place for regular legislative impact reviews
and cost checks on the executive branch by both federal and state
legislatures.
1. Legislative Impact Review
On the legislative front, a consideration of prosecutorial charging deci-
sions and their impact on incarceration and prison budgets by a legislative
committee would serve as a subconstitutional check.  There could be a
requirement that with every federal or state law passed, prosecutors have to
report on the impact of that law—and the probable data, including arrests
and convictions occurring as a result of that law.  The public should be made
aware of when the law is used, how it is used, and why it is used.  The legisla-
ture could consider the fiscal impact of a proposed legislation before enact-
ing any new criminal legislation.  Additionally, Congress has the power to
request documents and information from the executive regarding its
enforcement power and should use this power.  And to provide a further
check, Congress could place a sunset provision on all of the criminal legisla-
tion passed so that if criminal legislation on the state or federal level is passed
in response to a certain criminal event, Congress can reevaluate that law in
five or ten years and determine if the legislation is appropriate or has served
its purpose.  Reactionary criminal laws based on a certain high-profile event
should also involve a criminal code review to ensure that existing legislation
cannot adequately punish individuals for the particular harm caused.  This
www.law360.com/articles/340366/rakoff-slams-us-sentencing-guidelines-for-being-too-
harsh (“In speaking during the New York City Bar Association’s first white collar summit,
U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff said federal sentencing guidelines foolishly suggest judges
can use simple arithmetic to answer the complex question of what is an appropriate pun-
ishment for a crime.”).
347 See Baradaran, supra note 93, at 304 nn.438–39 (giving examples of complaints
judges have raised regarding mandatory minimum sentencing laws).
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would help reduce the proliferation of overlapping criminal laws that pro-
vide the executive with more options each year in charging defendants.
Congress may request the executive to disclose documents, provide
reports, or hold open meetings through Article I.348  For instance, Congress
could require an annual report from the executive branch regarding investi-
gations and prosecutions.  This could indicate the investigation and prosecu-
tion priorities, declinations, and convictions.  There is some precedent for
this as the legislature has the power to require information from the execu-
tive and can release this information to the public.  The Department of Jus-
tice releases statistical reports each year with much of the data Congress
would be interested in auditing, including enforcement priorities, convic-
tions, declinations, and other information.349  However, without an audit
and in-hearing review by the legislature, there is little accountability.  For
instance, in the 2013 annual report, the DOJ reported its enforcement priori-
ties were terrorism and violent crime.350  However, of the 61,529 cases the
DOJ prosecuted, only 0.3% were terrorism- or national security-related and
19.7% were violent crime cases.351  The majority of cases brought by the
executive branch were immigration (38.6%) and drug cases (21.8%), which
were not on the list of priorities.352  Congress could bring DOJ officials into
hearings and question them about the stated priorities and actual actions
taken and demand answers as to why there was such a heavy focus on drug
crimes, when violent crimes were a stronger stated priority.  This is the kind
of questioning that Congress could do to help keep the executive accounta-
ble to its goals.  It could also help Congress understand the effect of its legis-
lation on the enforcement of the law.  Annual statistical reports in states and
the federal government to measure the enforcement of key priorities to hold
prosecutors accountable would serve as an important subconstitutional
check.
2. Legislative Cost Checks
A potential subconstitutional check is forcing the branch of government
imposing laws to be directly responsible for the fiscal impact of that law.  This
is not currently a check on the federal or state level.  Missouri and Minnesota
have recently passed a fiscal impact law to measure the impact of laws on
348 See Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair “The Broken Branch”?, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 765, 770–72 (2009) (noting that congressional oversight is an implied power from
Article I).
349 See DOJ EXEC. OFFICE STATISTICS 2013, supra note 255.
350 Id. at 7 (“The number one priority of the United States Attorneys is to prevent
terrorism and promote the nation’s security.  During Fiscal Year 2013, the United States
Attorneys also continued their longstanding commitment to fighting violent crime and
addressing other special emphasis areas, including civil rights violations, financial fraud,
crimes against vulnerable victims, hate crimes, and human trafficking.”).
351 Id. at 7, 11.
352 Id. at 11.
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race, but this would not capture this data.353  This may also help prevent
legislatures, judges, and the executive from working together.  If each branch
felt the direct effects of its actions in the criminal context, each would have
the incentive to prevent undue costs.  For instance, if the federal or state
legislature wants to pass a law allowing harsher punishment that will likely
increase incarceration rates, it should have to earmark specific funding for
that law.
On the state level, forcing state prosecutors to absorb the costs within
their county of the individuals they choose to convict and incarcerate can
reduce costs and create a check.  Currently, in many states, state prosecutors
convict individuals and are elected at a county level, while state prisons are
funded at a state level.354  Therefore, the individuals in charge of bringing
cases are not facing the consequences of their decisions and the taxpayer
electorate is also not able to consider this in its decision.  Another possibility,
creatively suggested by David Ball, would be to distribute money among
counties based on crime rates and allowing local decisionmakers to spend it
as they see fit.355  They can choose to fund crime prevention, drug treatment,
or prison beds, and they have the option to use it in an optimal way and may
be held accountable by the public in doing so.
These are just a few potential subconstitutional checks that could be
employed to prevent criminal justice dysfunction.  While I begin the discus-
sion and provide a blueprint for potential prescriptions, the major contribu-
tion of this Article is the external constitutional critique of criminal justice
and the insight that subconstitutional checks within each branch are neces-
sary to fix the collusion among the branches.  Another contribution is
explaining why fixing symptoms of criminal justice dysfunction will not pro-
vide a lasting solution to the broad criminal justice problems we face.  Other
researchers can help fill the remaining gaps on how, specifically, subconstitu-
tional checks should function in criminal justice.
CONCLUSION
There is no question that the American criminal justice system suffers
from dysfunction.  There are abuses by police and prosecutors with little
accountability, overcriminalization and mass incarceration in state and fed-
eral prisons, and wrongful and pressured convictions by plea agreements
without any judicial oversight.  Most suggested solutions to address this dys-
function involve reforming one branch of government.  For instance, the leg-
353 See Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 1004 (2010)
(“Until our reality—in the form of statistical data detailing improving life circumstances
across race—matches our aspirations, then racial categories and the effects they have cre-
ated should be the subject of meaningful review within our courts.”).
354 See generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4
(2010) (discussing the need for transparency and checks on institutions that go beyond the
city and state level).
355 See W. David Ball, Defunding State Prisons, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1060, 1062–63, 1073–75
(2014).
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islature should stop mandatory minimum sentences or draconian three-
strikes and drug legislation.356  Or judges should better enforce Miranda
rights or the right to confrontation.357  Or we should rein in prosecutor and
police abuses.358  While these would be important improvements, these
reforms demonstrate a profound underestimation of the problem.  Only by
first understanding the deeper constitutional dynamics of the criminal justice
system, and how modern changes have deeply offset the constitutional bal-
ance between the three branches, can we then embark on a path of lasting
change in criminal justice.
The current criminal justice system is failing because it lacks functional
constitutional checks.  Constitutional checks have failed to function due to
aligned incentives among the three branches that work in concert against
criminals.  While judges should enforce constitutional rights and interpret
statutes, they have largely abdicated this function due to extreme deference
to prosecutors and police and their approval of a system dominated by plea
agreements, which allows only a minimal role for judges.359  Similarly, legisla-
tures have worked hand-in-hand with prosecutors to strengthen executive
power by passing a large number of criminal statutes and providing harsh
sentences without imposing any limits or supervision on how these laws are
enforced.360  As a result, the executive branch has operated largely since the
1980s and 1990s in the criminal realm with few real constitutional checks
from the other branches.  Indeed, separation of powers is failing, as two
branches have ceded their power to the third.
Rather than trying to address the individual failing branches, this Article
contends that instituting subconstitutional checks—stopgaps adopted by the
three branches of government to effectuate the rights in the Constitution
when the system is stalled in dysfunction—could create meaningful change.
The failure of structural checks and separation of powers has only harmed all
of our individual constitutional rights.  In other fields, like administrative law,
subconstitutional checks have stepped in to honor the original constitutional
356 See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1276, 1276 (2005); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 104, 127 (2003).
357 See Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause and
the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 420 (1994) (discussing how one of the
consequences of eliminating Miranda rights “would seriously infringe upon personal liber-
ties”); Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1913
(2014) (“[T]he Confrontation and Self-Incrimination Clauses expressly address evidentiary
issues at trial and have always been viewed as judicially enforceable through in-trial
exclusion.”).
358 Stuntz, supra note 50, at 5.
359 See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1150 (2001); see also Alschuler, supra note 49, at 6, 10, 38;
Fisher, supra note 49, at 864.
360 Stuntz, supra note 36, at 2003; Comment, supra note 53, at 209.
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balance of powers.361  In order to accomplish this in criminal law, we must
create checks within each branch and stop the current collusion of the three
branches against criminal defendants.
The creation of subconstitutional checks requires these potential
changes: First, the judicial branch should provide meaningful constitutional
review of plea agreements to make sure the rights of defendants are
respected and statutes are interpreted properly, since so few cases go to trial.
Second, the legislative branch should institute legislative impact reviews and
cost checks to measure the impacts of criminal legislation, and institute sun-
set provisions for criminal legislation. Third, the executive branch should
institute direct review of line prosecutors and police from the highest levels
of the executive branch and create transparency of broad—not case-spe-
cific—criminal justice data to the public.  By adding subconstitutional checks
within each branch we can provide the additional review and guidance neces-
sary to allow real constitutional balance and, as an important byproduct,
criminal justice reform.  All three branches must be involved to justify the
punishment of ordinary citizens.  The path described here is certainly less
efficient, with more burdens required to charge and punish citizens, but this
slower path is a wiser one prescribed by the Constitution.
The proposal for subconstitutional checks in criminal justice—like this
Article—is a first step.  If subconstitutional checks were adopted properly,
there would be lasting systemic change in criminal justice.  Meaningful
change is difficult, however, and, as demonstrated here, requires coordina-
tion and effort from all three branches of government.  We are far from this
right now.  But, at the very least, this Article will help academics, policymak-
ers, judges, and prosecutors understand why typical criminal justice reforms
involving one branch will never fix the dysfunction of the criminal justice
system.  It will also help judges and legislators understand the implications of
abdicating their power to the executive branch in each individual case or
with each criminal statute passed.  And in so doing, it will start an ongoing
conversation about how to reimagine the original constitutional protections
for criminal defendants using subconstitutional checks.
361 See Michaels, supra note 1, at 522; Note, Comparative Domestic Constitutionalism:
Rethinking Criminal Procedure Using the Administrative Constitution, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2530,
2530–33 (2006).
